[EM] FBC comparison: WV, margins, MMPO, DMC

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Sat Sep 10 06:53:07 PDT 2005


Dear Adam!

In both your examples,
>  9% C>>B>A
>  15% C>>A>B
>  25% C>A>>B
>  12% B>C>>A
>  12% B>>A>C
>  17% A>B>>C
>  10% A>>B>C
and
>  5% C>>B>A
>  5% C>>A>B
>  39% C>A>>B
>  12% B>C>>A
>  12% B>>A>C
>  25% A>B>>C
>  2%   A>>B>C
in which the C-voters insincerely buried the sincere Condorcet Winner B, the straightforward counterstrategy for those who prefer B to C is easy and requires no insincere rankings (as would wv require): They just need to vote their sincere rankings and approve of B and everything above B. 
>  9% C>>B>A
>  15% C>>A>B
>  25% C>A>>B
>  12% B>>C>A
>  12% B>>A>C
>  27% A>B>>C
I said so various times, but you continue talking about the 17% alone without considering the whole situation. Obviously, when we are talking about counterstrategy, the relevant group of voters is those who prefer the sincere winner to the manipulated winner, in this case all who prefer B to C. This group has in DMC a sincere counterstrategy, but needs insincere equal-ranking in winning votes. 

I consider it considerably less relevant what kind of counterstrategies some small and special subgroup of those who prefer the sincere winner has.

Yours, Jobst


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