[EM] FBC comparison: WV, margins, MMPO, DMC
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Sep 9 08:03:36 PDT 2005
--- Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de> a écrit :
> But you suggest not this easy countermeasure but a more difficult one:
> > Now, imagine you are in the 17% A>B>>C faction, and you are aware of the situation. The only
> > way you can prevent C from winning is by insincerely disapproving of A.
> It is true that they can perform this, but it is false that this is the only strategy for the
> A-voters to prevent the C-voters from manipulating the election by burying. In fact, it is far
> more natural for the A-voters to just approve B which effectively protects B from losing.
> You could answer that this requires that some of the last 10% approve B but that they perhaps
> won't do so since they don't care which of their non-approved candidates B,C wins. But then you
> assume that the actual sincere preferences are rather like this:
One faction (that is, one arbitrary partition of the voters) can only control what
it does itself. You're saying that the 17% faction doesn't have favorite betrayal
incentive, because a different faction should have voted differently.
When I say "incentive" I only mean the opportunity; I don't mean to imply that
voters would necessarily be aware of, or inclined to think of, this opportunity.
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