[EM] RE: (crossposted) Revisiting Copeland

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Sep 9 07:52:07 PDT 2005


--- Rob Lanphier <robla at robla.net> a écrit :
> In thinking about proposals for public elections, it occurs to me that
> we may have dismissed Copeland's method too soon.
> So, why not Copeland, with a simple tiebreaker (e.g. plurality, or at
> most Minmax(wv))?  That'd be very similar to how the NFL (U.S. football)
> picks the divisional champions, which is first by win-loss-tie, then by
> intradivisional win-loss-tie, then by total points scored.

I couldn't support Copeland unless you use a tiebreaker that satisfies
minimal defense. Otherwise:

49 A
24 B
27 C>B

A could be elected, for instance with a plurality tiebreaker.

You suggested in a later message that plurality should be applied by 
eliminating Copeland non-winners first, and then counting first preferences.
But I don't believe that is monotonic.

I don't have to tell you that a plurality tiebreaker would bring massive
favorite betrayal incentive.

Kevin Venzke


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