[EM] Re: AWP versus DMC

James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Wed Sep 7 15:34:17 PDT 2005

"Simmons, Forest " <simmonfo at up.edu> writes:
>as I said in a recent message, I also think that AWP is more resistant to
>burying than DMC.  But until there is a simpler description of AWP, I
>will support DMC over AWP in the category of "Condorcet Public Proposals."

	Is DMC's burying resistance strong enough to make it a good public
proposal? Again, maybe so, but I'd like to see an argument for this, and
for the assertion that DMC is more resistant than WV.

	A simple explanation of AWP, with an "SD" completion:
1. If you approve A but not B, your A>B preference is called a "strong
2. The strength of a defeat is the number of strong preferences in
agreement with it.
3. Drop the weakest defeat that's in a cycle until there's an unbeaten

	What is the simplest explanation of DMC?

	The AWP explanation above is not as simple as approval, MMPO, IRV, etc.,
but not staggeringly complex. "Public proposability" as a general binary
criterion has no meaning; public acceptance of complex ideas will vary
widely depending on the "public" that is involved, and the resources
employed by advocates. My own conjecture is that in most cases where AWP
is too complex, DMC is also likely to be too complex. (However, I am not
interested in arguing this point unless systematic focus group research is
an option; otherwise I will regard contradicting statements as equally
conjectural to my own.) In such cases, approval and IRV may be interesting
possibilities. In other cases, of course, no change is feasible at all.

my best,

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list