[EM] favorite betrayal; and about DMC's history

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Sep 6 06:52:24 PDT 2005


--- Warren Smith <wds at math.temple.edu> a écrit :
> Also, concerning the elegant hybrid Condorcet-Approval method DMC.
> Simmons wanted to push it as sort of best of breed.   I am coming to agree with him.
> I had attacked DMC as apparently leading to 2-party domination, while Condorcet(wv, =)
> would not be - but as we see the latter part of that attack is now somewhere
> between questionable & false.

Well, my "improved Condorcet Approval" method does not suffer from favorite
betrayal incentive. Its main shortcoming relative to DMC is that I don't
recommend an explicitly-placed approval cutoff under ICA.


> I also had noted Heitzig was pushing DFC not DMC despite being named as DMC's inventor.
> However, Heitzig is denying paternity.

Looking through the EM archives, I find that this is the history of DMC:

Sep 1, 2003: I suggested it as an alternative to Smith//Approval.

Nov 4, 2004: I suggested it as a rule to be used in conjunction with a method
I came up with to more easily hand-count three-slot ballots.

Jobst criticized this method because in a three-candidate cycle, the approval
winner is not necessarily the winner. Also, when you rank A>B and approve both,
this can contribute to the strength of the reverse defeat B>A. Jobst criticized
that this would make it difficult to convince people to vote.

Mar 5, 2005: Russ Paielli brought the method up again as being a good public 
proposal. He referred to my 2003 post.

by Mar 17: The name "DMC" was suggested by Forest, and generally accepted.

Kevin Venzke


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