[EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
Dave Ketchum
davek at clarityconnect.com
Mon Sep 5 17:57:20 PDT 2005
I see some to applaud here:
On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:56:32 -0400 Andrew Myers wrote:
> Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:51:40 -0400
> From: Andrew Myers <andru at cs.cornell.edu>
> To: Stephane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
>
> On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>
>>Actually as many people will tell you,
>>this claim is wrong.
>>
>>I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
>>
>>Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
>>criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of margins
>>can make your claim true for strong Condorcet winners
>>(ones which have a more than 50% majority against every
>>other candidate). Using margin as a criteria your claim is only valid
>>for stronger Condorcet winners (having a 2/3 majority against
>>every other candidate).
Another argument for wv over margins - which I already prefer for other reasons.
>>
>>Finally, no method is know to garantee the election of a weak
>>Condorcet winner against unsincere preferences. This
>>is understandable because absentees can always alter the balance
>>against the Condorcet winner and hope to unsincerely create
>>a cycle containing one of their better choice.
>>
>>Hope it helps,
>>Steph.
>>
>
> That's very helpful and makes perfect sense. I guess we could guarantee no weak
> CW by requiring that voters order all candidates, but this might be seen to be
> onerous. On the other hand, there will probably be a set of "plausible"
> candidates and if voters know they should make sure to rank all of them it
> would help create a strong CW. One could also imagine employing a runoff
> election mechanism in the case of a top cycle (as Juho suggested) where
> additionally voters were required to give a total order on all candidates to
> defend against strategic voting.
I choke on forbidding truncation, for I see that generating excessive noise.
However, I see here ranking all the "plausible" candidates, which I see as
less pain. Further, I suspect it does not demand full compliance - seems
like partial compliance would defend against all but the strongest strategies.
I do choke on runoffs. Aside from being expensive, they have their own
problems. Better to make strategies as difficult as practical and
tolerate what was close to a tie being pushed the wrong way without the
strategists getting caught and, hopefully, punished.
>
> Thanks,
>
> -- Andrew
--
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
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