[EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Sun Sep 4 23:30:47 PDT 2005

Might this be getting too deep?

A cycle is a near tie among at least 3 candidates, together with second 
choices linking the members together (even with near ties, second choices 
can be incompatible with cycles).

Plotters might, assuming they have accurate prediction plus control of 
enough voters:
      Starting near a cycle, cause one.
      Starting with a cycle, change the winner.
      Starting with a cycle, cancel its existence.
      Starting with a near tie among two candidates, change winner without 
being able to, or wanting to, cause a cycle.

If you are far from the above, plotting becomes impractical.

On Sat, 3 Sep 2005 15:15:43 -0400 Andrew Myers wrote:

> On Sat, Sep 03, 2005 at 12:58:05PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
>>Hi All,
>>What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest 
>>claim "Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is 
>>no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one"?
>>BR, Juho
> Thanks to Rob and Juho for correcting me.  I would like to have a statement
> about strategic immunity that doesn't rely on people judging the difficulty of
> creating a top cycle.  Presumably creating a top cycle would require a number
> of (effectively coordinated) insincere votes that is greater than half the
> margin of the weakest sincere preference for the CW?
> Is there any stronger statement that can be made for strategic immunity
> of specific completion methods, ideally ones that satisfy the summability
> criterion?
> Best,
> -- Andrew

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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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