[EM] A few brief replies

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Thu Sep 15 21:13:37 PDT 2005

I suggested the power-truncation option as a way of further removing 
strategy dilemma from the FBC-complying rank methods. If you mark the 
power-truncation box on your ballot, then everyone whom you don't rank is 
scored as if you'd ranked _all_ of the other candidates over him/her. So 
power trunction gives a stronger meaning to truncation.

Mr. Lomax suggested a 2nd balloting by Approval, in the event of a circular 
tie in pairwise-count. That's a good solution for circular ties. With the 
results of the 1st balloting available to voters, in pairwise-count form, 
the voters can identify offensive order-reversal, and then retaliate against 
it by not giving an Approval vote to the perpetrators' candidate. I've 
suggested Pairwise//Approval for when voters (or committee-members) will 
accept pairwise-count, but can't agree on a circular tiebreaker.

But, if voters would accept this modification, I suggest that the 2nd 
balloting not be held unless all the pairwise defeats in the circular tie 
are majority defeats--a majority of the voters ranking one over the other. 
Otherwise, just use a wv method such as SSD or PC or Smith//PC, for public 
elections. Or BeatpathWinner or CSSD or PC, for committees, meetings or 
organizations. I've called this Condorcet//Approval.

The advantage is that otherwise-successful offensive order-reversal against 
a majority-supported CW can be identified by a circular tie consisting 
entirely of majority defeats. So, for purpose of anti-order-reversal 
enhancement,  there's no need to hold the 2nd balloting unless the circular 
tie consists of all majority defeats.

This requires getting agreement for wv Condorcet, and also for the 2nd 
balloting. Of courses it's easier to get agreement for just the 2nd 
balloting, a simpler proposal. So Pairwise//Approval has that merit.

If voters are don't agree on a circular tiebreaker, but would accept 
pairwise-count, with circular ties solved in a 2nd balloting, then 
Pairwise//Approval would be a top public proposal.

Biut of course they'd have to at least agree to pairwise-count, and be 
willing to accept the expense and effort of a 2nd balloting. So RV seems 
like the easiest to ask for, of all the good public voting systems.

Mike Ossipoff

Don’t just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! 

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list