[EM] Rob: Condorcet's strategy problem
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed Sep 14 19:53:00 PDT 2005
Incidentally, this particular scenario presents some nasty strategy
problems for Range and Approval as well.
Nasty enough to make voters bury their favorite?
Nope. That incentive will never exist withApproval or Range Voting.
It's a question of which you'd rather the LO2E progressives do: Shall they
vote Dean equal to Nader, or shall they vote Dean, and all the other
Democrats, over Nader, when preferring Nader to the Democrats?
Sure. Some will, some won't, and we can't predict the exact percentages.
Maybe only a few will. Maybe my report about the two voters I can speak for
is just a very unlikely coincidence. But, based on what is known to be
optimal for voters who perceive an acceptable/unacceptable situation,
there's a good chance that lots of LO2E progressives will do that with
Condorcet, in public political elections.
Please note that I myself like wv Condorcet, and that I advocate
BeatpathWinner or CSSD for committees and organizations, where there's no
really scary lesser-evil.
This is a relatively close
three-way race, so making the decision to approve your second choice is
quite a conundrum. This is why I'm coming to really dislike Approval as
a method. It only works well with a unidimensional modeling of the
Approval's strategy issue can be an issue in 1-dimensional issue-space too.
But Approval guarantees something that Condorcet doesn't guarantee: Never
any incentive to bury one's favorite.
That might be the tendency for newbies backing candidates so far on the
fringe that they know they are going to lose. I can't imagine those
with long-term experience with the system would continue to vote that
Anyone who perceives an acceptable/unacceptable situation and wants to vote
optimally will favorite-bury if it would maximize the probability that the
winner will be an acceptable candidate.
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