[EM] Moderating vs suppressing

[Dave Ketchum]

I am addressing this to both Condorcet and EM.

This disagreement needs serious response.  According to Jobst:
      Jobst's posts to Condorcet are being suppressed by Jeff.
      Jeff, apparently, is suppressing for disagreeing opinions rather 
than for unsuitable content.

Seems to me moderator business is controlling quality of accepted posts 
without considering agreement/disagreement with personal technical opinions.

DWK

On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 20:27:34 +0200 Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Subject:  Re: Rejection of messages on [Condorcet]

> Jeff, your repeated "not approving" of a posting which utters a
> different opinion that yours is not acceptable to me. I request you stop
> this kind of behaviour or appoint a second moderator for those
> discussions you're personally involved in. After all, moderation
> requires a considerable degree of neutrality in my view.
> 
> Yours, Jobst
> 
> 
> Jeff Fisher wrote:
> 
> 
>>Jobst, I think you misunderstood some of my comments, so we should go
>>around privately at least once before troubling the rest of the group
>>(or dropping this thread)...
>>
>>
>>
>>>>It's only when preferences are trumping each other that approval 
>>>>might become significant.
>>>>
>>>They do not trump each other in the set of those candidates which
>>>are left after we considered all double defeats.
>>>
>>
>>That's already understood. However, to claim the DMC method as its own
>>justification is a tautology. It begs the question of why it was valid
>>to drop a doubly defeated candidate when the only pair-wise defeat is
>>against someone other than the winner.
>>
>>
>>
>>>Immunity from 2nd place complaints... Otherwise a majority could
>>>boycott the winner...
>>>
>>
>>How does one boycott an office holder? This sounds like a Euro thing
>>not applicable in the US.
>>
>>Whenever there is a Condorcet paradox, any candidate we choose as the
>>winner is going to face a majority that preferred another.
>>
>>
>>
>>>>one opens the door to "first place" complaints.
>>>>
>>>What is this?
>>>
>>
>>Complaints from the candidate with the highest approval rating --
>>presumably the most popular candidate (but not really, once tactical
>>voting runs rampant under DMC).
>>
>>
>>
>>>>However, DMC sometimes treats one candidate's 
>>>>approval as the reason that someone *else* should win, 
>>>>
>>>How's that? Please give an example!
>>>
>>
>>I already have... adding approval to your least threatening rival
>>increases your chances of doubly defeating your most threatening
>>rival, and it doesn't even matter if you over shoot and boost your
>>rival's approval above your own, DMC still picks you as long as you
>>win head to head.
>>
>>What this does is motivate factions to add massive approval for
>>strategically chosen rivals, destroying its meaning as "approval".
>>We're left with the candidate having the most *first place* votes
>>being able to control the outcome of a paradox.
>>
>>
>>
>>>>In short, DMC is interesting on its surface, but no more
>>>>interesting than any other cycle breaker. 
>>>>
>>>It's not a cycle breaker.
>>>
>>
>>It is what it is, whether you express it that way or not.
>>
>>
>>
>>>It does avoid looking at cycles altogether.
>>>
>>
>>It may avoid looking, listening and speaking of cycles, but it breaks
>>them anyway.
>>
>>
>>
>>>That's one of the main advantages.
>>>
>>
>>That's a mirage, a matter of appearance only. Cycles (Condorcet
>>paradoxes) can exist, and DMC resolves them whether you want to admit
>>it or not. You may not deny their existance (and DMC's handling of
>>them) just because DMC does not identify them on the way to selecting
>>its winner.
>>
>>
>>
>>>>By using approval data to pick anyone other than the most
>>>>approved, DMC gives voters an incongruous motivation
>>>>
>>>Could you give an example...
>>>
>>
>>I already have. Take a case where the second most approved candidate
>>wins DMC. There's someone further down the list among the doubley
>>defeated candidates who beat that winner head to head. If the most
>>approved candidate sees this coming, then he can win by drumming up
>>approval for that loser, turning our would-be winner into a doubley
>>defeated one, leaving #1 as the winner.
>>
>>If you are looking for ABC's... You, Kevin and perhaps Forest are best
>>at manipulating those. I am not a mathematician. If someone can
>>demonstrate that candidates can never have enough maneuvering room for
>>insincere approval in paradox cases, then we will all be grateful.
>>Otherwise, I'll assume that candidates in DMC will be telling their
>>supporters to falsely approve rivals they beat pair-wise.
>>
>>-- JRF

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.