[EM] Re: wiki
Abd ulRahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Thu Sep 1 10:07:54 PDT 2005
At 02:01 AM 9/1/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>Dear Abd ulRahman!
> > I'll disagree that "only randomized methods can do so," since there are
> > other alternatives that are neither deterministic or randomized,
> > beginning with the simple one of holding some kind of runoff.
>Assume there is no sincere CW. Then each candidate is defeated by some
>other. You suggest runoffs which count as deterministic in the sense
>that the *whole* procedure will produce a single winner which depends
>only on the ballots cast.
This is a stretch of the term "deterministic." If, for example, there
is a tie in an election (according to the rules, i.e., no definite
winner), and the resolution is to undergo some process which does not
involve ballots (there would be many such methods), but instead
involves either chance or the exercise of judgement, it is not common
usage to call this "deterministic." I'll point out that resolving the
election by random choice would be, by the apparent definition you
use, "deterministic." It produces a single winner.
Deliberative methods may involve at some point the casting of
ballots, but they are not, as a whole, deterministic. Neither with
random choice nor with a runoff or asset-type procedure is the
outcome predictable from the ballots cast *in the original election."
> I claimed there cannot be a group strategy
>equilibrium in that case, that is, a way of voting such that after the
>election there is no group of voters who can say 'If only we had voted
>like so-and-so, we had the result so-and-so which we all prefer to the
>result at hand'.
Neither does random choice procedure produce this result. I have not
examined DFC in intimate detail, but based on what I have seen,
random choice is only used if the election result is not clear based
on the primary criteria. If the election proceeds to the point of
random choice, one of the possible outcomes will very likely involve
a set of voters who could have altered the outcome in the direction
they favor, had they voted differently, because had they voted
differently, the election would not have proceeded to the random choice phase.
I agree that random choice has an element of appeal, and *especially*
when used for representative elections, because it would give a
possibility of representation to parties which might otherwise not
quite make it. Representative elections almost inherently fail to
represent fully the public. Some PR methods can approach success in
this, however. Delegable Proxy, practically by definition, produces
full representation. (Presumably in an assembly with a large
jurisdiction, there would be full participation limits -- but not
voting limits in DP --; however, voters may either find someone who
has already qualified, thus optimizing their representation, and give
their proxies to that person, or such voters may combine with other
such voters, if they can find enough of them. With a wide public FA,
it would be quite easy to find them. This is one reason why Free
Associations and Delegable Proxy are linked in my concept, though
they really are severable. (The largest known FA is not DP, and the
only known political DP application is not an FA.)
> It's quite easy to see that such an equilibrium does
>not exist: Assume the whole election process elected X, and that X is
>defeated by Y. Then the majority which prefers Y to X can say 'If only
>we had voted Y>rest, we had the result Y which we all prefer to the
>result at hand'. QED.
I may be arguing over a non-issue. I reread the DFC page and found
the method sufficiently unintelligible there that I could not say
that I understand it well enough.
> > Perhaps someone could take Mr. Heitzig's mail, with its concise
> > definition, and use it to clean up the wiki page. I'd do it if I had time.
>Please not "clean up" the page "imagine democratic fair choice" but add
>a new page "democratic fair choice". That was the whole point of my
>naming of the page. The idea is to have different descriptions for
Some wikis, depending on admin setup, allow creators of a page to
lock it. Presumably the attached discussion page would not be locked....
I read the Imagine Democratic Fair Choice page months ago and had the
same reaction. That is, I'm exactly sure, from it, what the method
is, and I see aspects that I don't like. It is entirely possible that
I have misunderstood the method and that what I don't like is only my
own imagination of the method, not the method itself. This is why a
good simple description of the method, which would include the ballot
form (as is on the Imagine DFC page), plus, without extra verbiage,
the procedure for determining the winner.
By the way, the use of a ranking submitted by candidates bears a
resemblance to one possible implementation of Asset Voting, in which
the revotes of candidates would be expressed in advance. Or of some
candidates, not necessarily all. This, again, resembles delegable
proxy for a newcomer who might consider the set of available proxies
(in DP implementations that I support, the existing proxy assignments
of those available to serve as proxies would be public record); by
selecting the proxy, the voter has selected the whole chain of
proxies, which then could determine, in advance, how votes would be reassigned.
In this system used as an election device (which is not its primary
intention), there would be private, secret proxies, assigned by
secret ballot, to a set of public proxies, people who have declared
their willingness, essentially, to vote in public.... Analysis of the
published proxy assignments would reveal loops, which could then be
broken by any member of the loop changing his or her assignment. With
loops broken (or, more accurately, becoming large enough that loops
do not exclude anyone from representation, since the whole loop
membership is larger than the assembly quota), there is then a
specific procedure available for resolving any election difficulty,
based on proxy assignments in effect as of a certain deadline.
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