[EM] The Range Voting example

[Paul Kislanko]

Mike wrote (see below for context):
"Sure, the A and B voters have to choose whether to help eachother or
compete 
with eachother, and if one competes and one helps, then that faction is 
being had. If they both compete, they both lose.

That's the co-operation/defection problem, as it occurs in voting systems."

Voters do NOT choose to "help each other." Mixing game-theoretical arguments
with voter behaviour is not helpful.

I'm sure as I'm heading into the voting booth Mike would like to be right
there to tell me how to vote, but IN GENERAL we need to talk about how
various methods work, not about how voters work. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at electorama.com 
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at electorama.com] On Behalf Of 
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2005 7:49 PM
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] The Range Voting example
> 
> Jim--
> 
> Thanks for the interesting and problematic example.
> 
> The real problem there is the co-operation/defection problem 
> that has been 
> discussed on EM a few times. It's usually discussed in terms 
> of Approval, 
> though the problem can  happen in Condorcet as an 
> order-reversal problem (if 
> the ATLO option isn't available).
> 
> That's the first time I've heard it as an RV scenario.
> 
> Of course, though exact voting predictions won't be 
> available, it's quite 
> possible that people will know that A and B are the frontrunners.
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> The real strategic idiots are the voters who like A and B 
> best. If they
> just kept their high rankings of each other, A or B would still win.
> Only, how high should they rank their second choice? Too 
> much, and their
> second choice wins over their first choice, and they need the 
> other guys
> to rate their second choice higher or their last choice (G) wins. This
> is starting to sound very much like the awful game that gets 
> played with
> some strategic Borda voting.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Sure, the A and B voters have to choose whether to help 
> eachother or compete 
> with eachother, and if one competes and one helps, then that 
> faction is 
> being had. If they both compete, they both lose.
> 
> That's the co-operation/defection problem, as it occurs in 
> voting systems.
> 
> I don't think that there's any solution to that problem. It 
> just has to be 
> accepted as something that one may have to deal with in 
> Approval, RV, or 
> maybe even Condorcet (if the ATLO option isn't available).
> 
> I don't consider it to be a serious problem. If the A voters 
> co-operate and 
> the B voters defect and take advantage of the A voters, the 
> result isn't a 
> majority rule violation.
> 
> And if there's a significant difference in A and B, then it 
> will be clear 
> that one of them is more of a compromise than the other is, 
> and that one 
> will have the advantage in the game of chicken, as the 
> rightful compromise. 
> And that more middle candidate's supporters will have less to 
> lose if the 
> one of the other, less desirable, candidates wins.
> 
> Or maybe one of {A,B} looks like a better votegetter than the 
> other. If A 
> looks stronger, then it would be more natural and expected 
> for the B voters 
> to give 10 points to A.
> 
> The fact that A & B depend, for their lead, on both getting 
> votes from both 
> candidate's supporters is what makes the problem. But if they 
> share so many 
> votes, how different can they be? And therefore how much 
> difference can it 
> make which one wins?
> 
> If I were an A voter, I'd give 10 points to both (or vote for 
> them both in 
> Approval). If the B voters really want to win so badly, then 
> let them have 
> their win, if A and B are as similar as is implied by all the 
> shared votes.
> 
> Other solutions:
> 
> One faction, the one that has the advantage of somewhat 
> greater size, or 
> more middle-ness as a compromise, or a sounder moral/ethical 
> position, could 
> publicly announce that of course everyone knows that that 
> co-operation/defection problem exists, and that they therefore are 
> announcing that they will not vote for the rival.
> 
> Or one or both factions could announce publicly that if the 
> other faction 
> defects, then that will be the last time they give a vote to 
> that faction. 
> That would be a stong discouragement to defection.
> 
> Aside from all that, as I said, if they're as similar as the 
> shared votes 
> suggest, I"d just vote for both.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff
> 
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