[EM] compulsory voting

[Abd ulRahman Lomax]

At 03:58 AM 10/18/2005, Chris Benham wrote:

>I'm not saying that compulsory voting is for its own sake in 
>principle desirable, just that at worse it can be counted
>as a minuscule evil that in practice is a simple way to counteract 
>much greater evils.

I'm saying that compulsory voting is coercive (this shouldn't be 
controversial!) and that coercion on the part of the state should be 
justified by social necessity. Both the benefit and harm of 
compulsory voting are unclear. The harm is not small however; the 
social cost of compyulsory probably exceeds what is currently spent 
on election campaigns. And that cost is born by the voters, it is a 
hidden tax. Miniscule? Compared to what? The value of the coerced 
labor could easily exceed all other expenditures involved in the election....

It's the wrong response to low voter turnout. I actually think this 
should be obvious.

I may have given an example in the past, but I'll repeat it here: 
there seems to be a common opinion that slower driving is safer 
driving, and it is often easy to convince authorities to lower posted 
speed limits in the name of safety. (That this increases revenue to 
local authorities from traffic fines is not the issue, it is claimed. 
My contacts in the police tell me otherwise.) The problem is that 
it's well known that posted speed limits have almost no effect on the 
actual speed at which people travel. This is fairly easy to 
understand: when people drive a route day after day, they become 
unconscious of the signs that they see every day; most people will 
drive, on "autopilot," at a speed where they feel comfortable. Some 
people drive faster than that, or have, from long habit of fast 
driving, conditioned themselves to be comfortable with high speeds; 
these are the true speeders.

So: the coercive response to perceptions of road safety: set lower 
speed limits and fine speeders. But this is ineffective, it does not 
make the road safer. A far better response would be to address truly 
unsafe road conditions; if road conditions are such that a normal 
driver will drive too fast, fix the conditions or add speed bumps or 
blinking lights or special warning signs. Usually those who drive 
roads frequently know how fast is safe: this is why U.S. Highway 
codes require that speed limits be set by measuring the speeds, under 
unbiased conditions -- no police car parked along the side of the 
road -- at which people actually travel; speed limits are supposed to 
be set no lower than the 85th percentile speed.

So if people don't vote, find out why! And fix it. Forcing them to 
vote won't address the real issue: the alienation of people from 
their government, the cynicism and despair about voting actually 
making a difference.

And now we come to the crux:

>Democracy is a form of  "rule".

That's it in a nutshell. Democracy, per se, is not a form of rule, 
for coercion is not intrinsic to democracy; rather, coercion may be 
necessary under conditions where full democracy fails.

>   It can only become compromised by too much "coercion" if  people 
> are denied
>the right to put their case
>  and to politically organise (freedom to express and have heard 
> their political views, freedom
>to associate in political parties, freedom to peacefully demonstrate 
>etc.)  or are denied the right to a basic education
>or their right to vote is compromised.

I've worked in the U.S. prison system as a chaplain. I can tell you, 
plenty of people here, and, I'm sure, elsewhere, are "denied the 
right to put their case and to politically organize." Felons are not 
permitted to vote, and in some jurisdictions, even after they are 
released, the denial of that right continues for life. Florida is a 
notorious example, where hyperactive search for felons on the voter 
roles resulted, probably, in the denial of the right to vote for many 
who were not felons, resulting in a narrow victory for Bush in 
Florida and thus in the U.S. electoral college (due to the Florida 
rule that all state electors go to the plurality winner). However, 
the denial of the right to vote for felons is utterly unjustified, 
especially if those felons are under no disadvantage due to 
incarceration, have paid their debt as society determined, and, 
indeed pay taxes (which they did even while they were incarcerated, 
if they had income). "No taxation without representation" is a 
popular slogan, not a law; quite simply, most people, for one reason 
or another, are not represented. If they own one $1 share of stock in 
a corporation, they *are* represented at the annual meeting of the 
corporation if they desire it. But they can pay a million dollars a 
year in taxes, and they do not necessarily have representation before 
the legislatures.

We have, in the U.S., and to varying degrees in other "democracies" 
around the world, a system which is far from fully democratic; what 
we really have is an oligarchy which uses certain nominally 
democratic forms. The oligarchy is much more subtle than we see in 
pure dictatorships or blatant fascism, but that the people, here, 
have theoretical access to the levers of power does not mean that 
they have *practical* access.

It does not have to be this way.

I'll say it again: the U.S. does have democratic institutions, in 
theory. It would have them in practice if there were parity in how 
the various elements of society were organized. The problem is not 
actually the governmental forms: the election methods, the rules for 
the formation of legislatures, etc. All these are sufficiently 
democratic that if the people could act coherently and cooperatively, 
the society could be fully democratic *without* any need to change 
election methods or rules.

But the people do not know how to organize; the methods of 
organization which elements of the people who realize the 
organizational problem attempt to use to accomplish a solution have, 
thus far, been the same traditional methods of organization which 
have produced the current situation; all that happens is that the 
names of the players change. There are exceptions: many alternative 
organizations in the U.S. use consensus process, which could be said 
to be direct democracy on steroids: no compulsion at all, any member 
may block a group action.

However, this must be considered experimental; it works only under 
certain conditions: small group size, members with ample leisure time 
to devote to the necessary and often tedious meetings, and a general 
agreement as to purpose among the members, from the start. But the 
existence and relative success of such organizations must be seen as 
a sign that democracy is possible, if difficult, without coercion, or 
certainly with much less coercion than we are accustomed to 
tolerating in organizations.

My goal is not to eliminate all coercion; rather my goal is to 
eliminate unnecessary and dysfunctional coercion. The first and most 
obvious aspect which should be addressed is the lack of 
representation. Corporations solved the problem centuries ago; 
indeed, the solution exists at common law and it is only the fact 
that the history of elections made it illegal, in most places, to 
vote by proxy in political elections (and where it is permitted, it 
is permitted only in a very limited way) that has resulted in the 
failure of legislative bodies to truly represent everyone.

>Democracy is all about rule of the majority, usually via (elected) 
>representatives. That majority must be informed.

By whom?

Elected representatives are not personal representatives. If there is 
an election, there are losers. Further, there is a term, such that a 
voter cannot withdraw his or her consent to be represented by a 
winner, for the term. The fact is that there is no reason not to 
allow direct democracy, where practical. And it could be practical 
under some circumstances; indeed, most corporations have not found it 
necessary to deny ordinary shareholders the right to vote at the 
annual meeting. Corporations do not allow absentee ballot, for very 
good reasons. The annual meeting is a deliberative body, and absentee 
voting is a bad idea, for those who vote should have had the 
opportunity to witness and, perhaps, participate in the 
deliberations. This condition is satisfied by proxy voting.

There are election systems which do approximate proxy democracy; 
however, proxy democracy still has features which are absent from any 
electoral system, and delegable proxy takes it to another level.

The features are:
(1) Personal choice as to representative. With delegable proxy, 
representation may be passed on. In proxy democracy, representatives 
are chosen, not elected.
(2) The right to personally vote, when the citizen/member/shareholder 
is able to do so, i.e., to attend the assembly and vote; or, perhaps, 
to follow and possibly participate in public deliberations, and to 
vote directly on any matter before the assembly, through remote means.
(3) Personally identified representation, with two-way communication 
possible with the chosen representative. Thus the citizen is 
*connected* with the assembly, and if the assembly is governmental, 
with the government.

Delegable proxy allows a mutually acceptable level of communication 
to exist between a direct proxy and the citizen/member. If the proxy 
is not available, the citizen can choose another proxy who is. If the 
proxy considers the citizen too demanding, the proxy can refuse to 
represent the citizen.

Now, this could be considered, at this point, a utopian scheme. 
Delegable proxy, in particular, has seen very little implementation. 
However, the point here is that full democracy is theoretically possible.

But there is a crucial point, I will repeat:

>Democracy is all about rule of the majority

No, not exactly. Democracy is about the *consent* of the people to 
government. If the people completely consent to the government, it is 
fully democratic. If they do not, to the extent that they do not, it 
is not fully democratic. "Majority" is an important turning point, 
but it does not indicate substantial consent.

For one thing, what passes for "majority" is often actually 
plurality, and sometimes not even that, where arcane rules apply.

There is a subtle point, often overlooked. The people working with 
consensus democracy have realized the organizational power of full 
consensus. When consensus systems work, organizational unity is enhanced.

It is my contention that modern societies have become successful 
largely due to the degree to which they practice democracy, that is, 
to the degree to which the governed consent to the government. Where 
such consent is widespread, the social organization is *effective* 
and relatively *efficient.* Where it is not, the society is bogged 
down; decisions are made by a few, and that few cannot match in 
intelligence and wisdom the collective intelligence of the whole 
society. And active collective intelligence requires freedom, it 
cannot be coerced; coercion confuses it.

But consensus systems don't always work. Where differences are too 
deep or the controversies too convoluted, the time it can take to 
find consensus solutions can expand beyond what the members can bear; 
when this happens, there are several breakdown modes, but a common 
one is that the status quo continues. Which can be, in this case, 
minority rule.

Majority rule *is* an important democratic principle, but that does 
not necessarily make majority rule wise. Rather, the majority has the 
*right* of decision. Who should decide when it is necessary to make a 
decision against the will of a minority? The majority. Any other 
answer results in minority rule. For example, it is not uncommon in 
consensus organizations for a special rule to exist which allows 
making a decision without full consensus. One co-housing community we 
almost bought into allows 80% to make a decision, after providing 
ample opportunity to find consensus. But that still allows minority 
rule, it merely increases the necessary size of the minority to 
continue to block decisions, from one single member to 20%+ of members.

I've become quite unpopular in consensus circles. by advocating the 
right of the majority to make an informed decision to relax consensus 
rules. I'm arguing in the other direction here: the majority does 
have the right to make decisions, without any restriction other than 
due-process protections, but it will ordinarily restrain itself, if it is wise.

The human body solved this organizational problem long ago. We make 
decisions by "majority rule," internally; essentially, we integrate 
nerve message "votes." However, when we are healthy, we are not 
content with a mere majority vote, we seek some degree of internal 
unity, we will not leap into action merely because at one moment in 
time, a majority of impulses are in one direction. People who do are 
mentally ill. But we do have emergency responses available; when 
necessity is sensed, we will indeed act based on an immediate majority.

Who decides when there is an emergency, which justifies overriding a 
minority, which justifies coercion? The majority decides. But that 
decision, in a democracy, should be conscious and explicit, and it 
should be understood that every time such a decision is made, society 
may be weakened. Just as with any strong medicine, there should be an 
indication justifying it.

>In reference to high voter turnout, Abd wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>If it is coerced, it means nothing.
>One thing I find annoying about Abd's argument is that it makes no 
>distinction between degrees of  "coercion".

That's nonsense. Specifically, degree of democracy was associated 
with degree of coercion. Very little coercion, very little deviation 
from democracy. How could this be "no distinction?"

>  Of  course
>a high turnout is somewhat  "devalued" by mild coercion,

No kidding!

>  but definitely not to the point that "it means nothing".

The *turnout* means nothing. The election might still mean something.

>In Australia voting is widely seen as something like wearing 
>seatbelts in cars and paying taxes. Everyone agrees that it would
>be better if everyone did those things, while at the same time 
>usually recognizing that they themselves might not always bother
>if the only incentives are the the greater good and the 
>perhaps-remote chance of an accident.

I've mentioned occasionally that I was a chaplain at San Quentin 
State Prison in California. "Criminals" will typically agree that 
there should be laws against the things they have done. (Drug 
traffickers may be an exception, that's a whole different issue.) 
They do think, however, sometimes, that their particular 
circumstances made it allowable for them to break the law. Or they 
don't: they simply will admit that they made a mistake.

I'm a little skeptical that "everyone" in Australia sees voting as 
claimed. For one thing, we have seen recently from Mr. Benham 
material vigorously defending compulsory voting from an Australian 
politician, who was claiming that those who wanted to eliminate the 
compulsion were essentially evil oligarchs who wanted to deprive the 
poor of representation. My impression was that of a politician given 
to hyperbole in pursuit of her own goals. Quite obviously, she was 
not arguing against thin air. There are Australians who want to 
eliminate the compulsion.

Personally, I do *not* agree that everyone should vote. In fact, I 
think most people are unqualified. In some cases, that includes me, 
I'm not an elitist; in fact, my position is that the only one who can 
decide if a voter is qualified or not is the voter himself or 
herself. This kind of thinking is behind the delegable proxy 
proposals I've been working with. Instead of voting on matters I 
don't understand (perhaps because of a lack of time to do the 
necessary research, perhaps because of other factors), I would prefer 
to lodge my voting power with someone I trust. This reduces my 
decision to one of whom to trust; and it's my opinion that people, 
qualified or not, have the *right* to make that decision.

And, indeed they do, at common law. Anyone who is legally competent 
can assign a power of attorney to anyone they choose to exercise 
almost all legal rights that could be exercised by the person himself 
or herself....

>Voting in Australia is seen as a civic duty, and the level 
>of  "coercion" is mainly about the state helping the citizens to discipline
>themselves.

Fascists everywhere have made this claim.

>   An  Australian comic (IMO not great) recently joked that voting 
> should continue to be "compulsory" but that paying
>the fine for not voting should be optional (for people with a bad conscience).

Sometimes jokes conceal great truths.

I have utterly no regret for abstaining from voting on issues where I 
do not have sufficient grounds to form an opinion. And I have little 
regret and no guilt for missing the opportunity to vote when it was 
seriously inconvenient. I've never seen an election turn on my absence....


>>How about this modest proposal? The government pays every voter an
>>amount to compensate for their time, at the rate shown by their tax
>>returns, or at a minimum rate for those not obligated to file returns.
>That completely sucks. People who pay higher taxes shouldn't be paid 
>more to vote.

It's just a small rebate from what they pay. *Why not*? Is everyone's 
time equally valuable? Note that a bias was introduced into the 
proposal in favor of paying the poor *more* than their time is 
"worth" as measured by taxes; there would be a minimum rate, probably 
something like minimum wage.

The government pays consultants, often huge amounts. Isn't voting a 
consultation with the people? Why shouldn't those who vote be paid 
for their time?

On the one hand, it is being claimed that voting is a civic duty, 
which presumes that it is of value to the state. Does that value 
exceed the value of the time of the voters? If not, they it is poor 
policy to force voters to vote, the social cost exceeds the social 
benefit. If it does exceed that value, then society is "making a 
profit" on the transaction. Paying the voters a minimal amount would 
not change that, it would merely reduce the profit.

I used the words "modest proposal" to indicate that the proposal was 
satyric. Paying voters the cost of their time would be 
*astronomical.* Well, not astronomical, just very, very expensive, 
more than I think any government is going to be willing to pay.

Note that the objection was not to the concept of paying the voters, 
but of paying some of them more than others. That wasn't at all an 
essential part of the proposal. If you really want the poor to turn 
out to vote, pay them to vote, and, of course, you would have to pay 
everyone the same. Does Mr. Benham like the idea better now?

The point of this thought was to show how valuable that time is. In 
the U.S., the time it takes to vote varies greatly, but, particularly 
in poor neighborhoods in big cities, it can take in excess of an 
hour. Even in a small town like mine, it takes perhaps twenty 
minutes. Okay, average it out, a half hour. At minimum wage, say $4 
per voter. Compulsory voting in the US might yield, what, 200 million 
votes? $800 million. That's what a U.S. election costs, valuing 
everyone's labor at minimum wage, which is undervaluing it substantially.


>>It would be eminently fair. If voters are performing a public service
>>by voting (the compulsory voting laws must assume that they are),
>>then it would certainly be reasonable to compensate them.
>Hello! Voters  *are*  the public.

So? Look, it appears that citizens are fined in Australia for failing 
to vote. Where does that money go?

Presumably it goes into the public treasury. Yet, I'm pretty sure, 
the law is enforced unevenly. Why not simply pay voters to vote; yes, 
of course, it comes from the taxes they pay. But it would make it 
unnecessary to fine them. They don't vote, they don't get the tax 
rebate, which is what it would amount to. The more I think about it, 
the more I like it....

Really. Everyone is so concerned about helping the poor and 
disadvantaged to vote, but the biggest obstacle for such people is 
precisely that they are poor and disadvantaged. To them $5 would be a 
significant benefit. To someone wealthy, it would mean nothing.

>In Australia,  elections are always on a Saturday and the polls are 
>open from 8am to 6pm.  There are lots of polling stations.

And if you are an observant Jew? And it is in the summer and the sun 
has not set by 6 pm? For some people, Saturday is the worst day to 
have to vote!

>People who don't expect that they will have time on the day can 
>apply for a postal vote and mail it before the day. People who
>give a good reason why they couldn't vote are exempt from paying the fine.

The whole thing, however, is made more reasonable by the allowance 
for postal voting. If you are poor, do you have to pay for the stamp?

>Maybe in the US more people work on a Saturdays than they do in 
>Australia. I've seen it suggested that polling day in the US be
>made a public holiday. I think that that is a good idea, better than 
>paying people to vote.

I think it would be even better to simply allow people to transfer 
their voting power to others. If they have time, they vote 
themselves. If they don't, then their act of choosing who to vote for 
them is a profound political act.


>>Having to stand in line to vote?
>>That's crazy. But it is the norm.
>Why is it "crazy"?  How else do you propose to ensure that votes are 
>secret and so cannot be sold or perhaps "coerced" by say
>a domineering partner?

But, it has been pointed out, mail voting is allowed. So that 
"domineering partner" can simply demand that you vote by mail and, of 
course [s]he will want to see the paper before it is mailed. There is 
an easy way around that one, but I'd bet it isn't legal in Australia. 
(Allow a person to vote more than once. The final vote is the 
controlling one. Note that absentee ballots are under seal, the outer 
envelope gives the name of the voter, the inner one contains the 
ballot which, of course, has no name. Procedurally, it would be 
simple to discard earlier ballots. And there could be other means for 
preventing coercion from being effective.)

Bottom line, though, the issue is not coercion, but coercion which is 
sufficiently widespread to swing an election. That's pretty difficult 
to pull off. I've never heard of it in the U.S. I think it is a 
bugaboo, a pink elephant which is kept away from Australia by 
compulsory voting and standing in long lines.


>>To my mind, democracy is government by *consent* of the people. To
>>the extent that the people consent, it is democratic. Coercing people
>>into voting is, quite simply, undemocratic. Even if the majority
>>approve of the practice.
>Why can't  people consent to being  "coerced"?

Consent is an ongoing thing. It's true that one may consent at one 
time to being coerced, but one is then under coercion, and it cannot 
be said that this condition continues by default. The whole point of 
consent is frustrated if we consider "consensual coercion" to be 
consent. Shame on you, Chris!

>   Definitions of  "consent"  vary from an explicit (perhaps signed) 
> statement that
>"I consent to x"  (which maybe can be revoked at any time and/or has 
>to be periodically renewed) to consent that is simply implied
>by continuing to obey the laws and not actively revolting/resisting, 
>or something vague between these two extremes.

Consent is a condition which exists at moment to moment. Or not. It 
is true that we are effectively bound by past consent, but this is a 
practical limitation. I may have consented to some condition years 
ago, when I did not know what it really would mean. Does that mean 
that I am *now* consenting to that condition?

Democracy has power to the extent that it enjoys the *continued* 
consent of the people.

The "consent" that is merely the weakness of the powerless is not 
consent, and this imaginary "consent" is nothing other than weakness, 
it is not what makes democracy strong.

>So it can be said that people sometimes "consent" to not having 
>elections and instead submit to the rule of a benign monarch, which
>isn't democracy.  Abd seems to be using a definition of  "consent" 
>that isn't compatible with "government".

No. I said that a government is democratic to the degree to which it 
enjoys the consent of the people. I could expand this in various 
ways, by adding, for example, "continued" to consent, which makes it 
more specific and clear that past consent does not make a *present* 
government democratic.

Adolf Hitler was elected, you know. So was the Hutu government of Ruanda.


>>What is the harm of allowing people not to vote? What if a person
>>considers himself unqualified to judge the candidates? "He can simply
>>not mark the ballot," it will be said. But then you have coerced this
>>person to coming to a room to exercise an act of futility.
>Big deal.  That is like people having to wait at a red  light when 
>there is no opposing traffic. In Australia the person could have 
>himself certified as being mentally defective and would then be 
>exempt from penalty.

That changes everything. Is a mentally defective person allowed to vote?

If so, why?

And what if the mentally defective person does not realize that he is 
mentally defective?


>Anthony Duff wrote:
>>
>>
>>I'd worry about the routine use of absentee ballots, because it then
>>becomes very easy for people to buy or coerce the voting of others.
>Exactly.

But this argument applies to *any* use of absentee ballots. If it is 
allowed as an exception, then those who wish to coerce may coerce 
their victim into claiming the exception.

The fact is that electoral coercion is much more difficult and 
hazardous on a broad scale (as distinct from a petty scale, where 
one's spouse demands political obedience) than is simple electoral 
fraud. Fraud is fairly common, as well as other technical 
manipulations of the system.

One that came to my attention recently was regarding the famous 
Florida 2000 debacle in the U.S. As I'm sure you know, overvoting is 
a cause for considering a ballot spoiled. However, Florida law 
provides that if a voter's intention is clear from the ballot, that 
intention is to be honored. It is just that an intention to vote for 
more than one in a single-winner election is not allowed.

There were ballots, as you may have heard, where it was less than 
crystal clear who the voter was voting for by punching a certain 
position. So there were Gore voters who punched out the Gore position 
and, then, apparently concerned by the ambiguity of this butterfly 
ballot, wrote in the name "Gore." Certain local officials then 
disqualified these as overvotes....

That's election fraud, really. But I've never heard of any penalties 
being applied for that kind of abuse. The officials can simply claim 
that they made a mistake. In this case, it was all moot, because, 
contrary to all precedent, the U.S. Supreme Court intervened to 
frustrate the state election process....

It's remarkable, I think, all the concern about voter coercion. The 
real core of democracy in action is deliberative process, which is 
almost never anonymous....