[EM] full rankings, voter desire for

[Kevin Venzke]

Rob,

--- Rob Lanphier <robla at robla.net> a écrit :
> Here's a related set of questions I've been meaning to ask:
> 
> 1.  Are the Later No Harm (LNH) criterion and the Sincere Favorite
> Criterion (SFC) mutually incompatible?

It seems I've caused some confusion. "Sincere Favorite" is my votes-only
attempt at FBC. I don't know of any method which satisfies one of FBC and
Sincere Favorite, but not the other, so there's not much need to discuss
these criteria separately.

"SFC" stands for "Strategy-Free Criterion" as Mike said.

> 2.  Are LNH and the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC) mutually
> incompatible?
> 
> 3.  Are LNH, SFC and FBC mutually incompatible?
> 
> If the answer to #3 is "no", I'm very interested in figuring out a
> system that satisfies those three.

As Mike said, MMPO satisfies all three of these (and Sincere Favorite).
But it fails SDSC (and minimal defense) and Plurality.

In my estimation, SDSC is more important than SFC. Failing Plurality is
probably not acceptable in a public election, since it makes the winner
very hard to justify (i.e. you'd have to explain what positive incentives
the method offers, to balance the counter-intuitive winner).

I don't believe SDSC and LNHarm to be compatible.

When SDSC is failed, this means that the method can elect the wrong one of
two frontrunners who have no overlapping support. SFC failures (which aren't
simultaneously SDSC failures) involve some voters ranking both of these
candidates. I think this makes SFC failures less of a problem for the perceived
legitimacy of the result, because those who would complain can at least
acknowledge that they could have truncated the candidate who did win.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger 
Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com