[EM] majority winner and range & condorcet methods

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Chris!

You wrote:
> This from Warren Smith (Tue.Oct.4):
> 
>> Robla failed to mention that range voting *does* obey a weakened form of
>> the majority-winner criterion (call it "WMW").  Specifically:
>>    "If a strict majority of the voters regard X as their unique
>> favorite, then
>>   they, acting alone without regard to what the other voters do, can
>> force his election."
>> I don't know about you, but I personally regard WMW as a
>> more-desirable critrion for
>> a voting system to obey, than Anderson 1994's MW criterion.
> 
> Warren,
> Are there any  methods actually  *fail*  this criterion?   Borda perhaps?

Random Ballot is such a method.

Yours, Jobst