[EM] Reversal's success & backfire probabilities same for all pairwise-count methods
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Mon Oct 24 15:43:13 PDT 2005
I'd previously said that, with MDDB, unopposed offensive order-reversal can
only succeed if the candidates' 1st choice strengths are in one particular
order. My hope was that the ratio of backfire-probability to
success-probability was greater for MDDB (and maybe MDD,ER-Buckling(whole)
than for MDDA, wv, & DMC.
Not so. This has probably been discussed here before: What I mean by
"unopposed" is "uncountered". Maybe "uncountered" would be a better term,
since it specifically says that anti-order-reversal counterstategy isn't
being used.
The usual assumption in order-reversal examples is that a majority rank
someone over the reversers' candidate. Otherwise why would we care if s/he
wins? And the reversers insincerely raise someone over the middle CW,
creating an artificial majority against him/her.
"Uncountered" means that no one is strategizing to thwart the offensive
order-reversal. In particular, if the middle CW's voters prefer the
reversers' candidate to the insincerely-raised candidate, they voter
accordingly. The usual assumption in the example, of course, should be that
that is what happens.
That's what I, and most of us, mean by an uncountered offensive
order-reversal example.
In that example, each candidate in the cycle is majority-beaten, and each
candidate in the cycle has the supporters of the candidate ahead of him in
the beat-cycle ranking over him/her the candidate behind him/her in the
beat-cycle. So it's symmetrical. So, if the favoriteness-strengths are
unknown, then the 3 candidates must have the same probabilties of winning.
So success, backfire, and neither must have the same probability for all
pairwise-count methods in an uncountered offensive order-reversal example.
Before I realized that, I was calculating the probabilities, and MDDB gives
plenty of opportunity for errors, hence my incorrect statement in MDDB's
favor.
Really, the only practical difference I know of between MDDA and MDDB is
that MDDB doesn't strictly meet SDSC (though it probably would fail it only
when there's a majority subcycle--I don't know).
But there are at least two other differences between MDDA and MDDB that
could be important:
1. MDDA is simpler, with an even briefer definition.
2. MDDB might be more pleasing to the person who doesn't like Approval, the
person who wants ranking counts used throughout the count.
So I claim that MDDB is still a candidate. So is MDD,ER-Bucklin(whole),
which I'll abbreviate as MDDERBW.
Maybe its less brief definition won't prevent it from being accepted, though
I'm inclined to try the simpler MDD methods.
MDDERBW is more briefly defined if ERBW can be defined in terms of mean
ranks. But mean ranks is a lot less obvious and natural than summed ranks,
which are what MDDB uses.
That's a similar complication issue between RV that just adds up each
candiates rating, vs the RV that calculates each candidate's mean rating. If
RV is going to propoed, we should get its full simplicity and brevity
advantage by just adding up each candidate's ratings, and declaring as winne
the candidate with greatest sum.
It may well be that, though mean ranks is briefer, the traditional
Bucklin-style definition of ERBW would be better accepted by people than its
mean ranks definition.
Mike Ossipoff
_________________________________________________________________
Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search!
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list