[EM] By their kind of preference, Approval & RV match Condorcet

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

As I said, it's a matter of individual subjective choice, about which kind 
of preference one wants to go by, and, as a result, whether one preferes 
Condorcet, Approval or RV.

Here are 3 kinds of preference, which I'll define later:

1. Bare preference (could also be called ordinary preference).
2. Emphatic preference.
3. Measured preference.

1. Bare preference or ordinary preference is what we usually refer to when 
we say that someone prefers X to Y. It could be that they _barely_ prefer X 
to Y, hence the name. Bare preference is the kind that Condorcet measures, 
and, as I said, it's the kind that we've usually been talkling about in 
votilng system discussion.

2. Emphatic preverence is what Approval measures. Do you prefer X to Y 
enough that X>Y is important enough to make it one of the preferences that 
you vote? Are X and Y on opposite sides of the most important or significant 
division into sets of higher and lower merit?

3. Measured preference is what RV measures. That's probably 
self-explanatory. The rating difference that you vote among two candidates 
is your measured preference between them.

In a posting some days ago I pointed out that, with pairwise-count, if 
voting is sincere and more prefer X to Y than Y to X, then X will beat Y 
pairwise.  And that, in Approval, if more people emphatically prefer X to Y 
than Y to X, then Y can't win, because X will outpoll Y.

I pointed out that, in that way, by emphatic preference, Approval matches 
what Condorcet does.

Someone could say, "Yes, but not the criteria."  Yes the criteria too, the 
emphatic preference version of them.

I'm not calling these actual criteria, because they haven't been written so 
that they apply to all methods. I only mention them for showing that,  by 
emphatic preference, Approval matches Condorcet, criteria and all. At least 
the important criteria.

Condorcet's Criterion:

What if there is a candidate who pairwise beats every other candidate, by 
emphatic preferences?
S/he gets the highest vote total and wins.

SFC:

What if a majority of the voters emphatically prefer X to Y? Y can't win, 
because X outpolls Y.

MMC:

If set of voters consisting of a majority of all the voters emphatically 
prefer all the candidates in set S to the other candidates, then the winner 
will come from S.

Obviously that goes for RV's measured preferences too.

That's why I say that, by emphatic preferences Approval matches Condorcet. 
And that, by measured preferences, RV matches Condorcet.

Additionally RV and Approval have their own social optimization, which has 
been discussed here.

It's just that, as an individual objective preference, I tend to prefer 
going by ordinary preferences, and so I'm a Condorcetist, and I claim that, 
by ordinary or bare preference, SSD is the ideal best for public elections 
if voters make good judgements about who is good enough to vote over their 
favorite, or if the greater-evils have been voted out of the political 
system. (It's because those desirable conditions don't obtain in our public 
political elections that, as a practical matter, I prefer MDDA for public 
elections, and consider RV and maybe Approval to be the best public 
proposals, when winnability is taken into account.

But, even under conditions where FBC wasn't needed, I'd gladly accept 
Approval or RV for public political elections, if others wanted it, or if 
feasibility considerations necessitated it. Likewise, in organizations, I 
have no objection to Approval or RV if others prefer them, or if they're 
more convenient.

Mike Ossipoff

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