[EM] Rob: MDDA, 10/15/05
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sat Oct 15 19:51:50 PDT 2005
Rob--
You wrote:
I agree with Warren that a system that doesn't break down in the face of
full rankings is highly desirable, for many of the reasons that he
cites.
I reply:
I assume you're implying that MDDA breaks down in the fact of full rankings.
If everyone but me were going to vote full rankings in MDDA, I'd vote only
for Nader, and so Nader would automatically win the approval count. Unless
Nader has a majority defeat and someone else doesn't, Nader wins. The
full-ranking electorate have given me the power to choose the president.
For everyone to rank fully in MDDA would be unstable, because any one voter
could improve his/her expectation by bullet-voting, assuming that we don't
have information about who is likely to be majority-disqualified.
Approval, too, would "break down" if everyone voted for all the candidates.
I recommend against doing so. As Kevin pointed out, it makes no sense
whatsoever to rank all the candidates in MDDA. Don't rank your last choice.
Then you're voting everyone over him/her in Approval. You're casting an
Approval vote that says who is the worst candidate. As Kevin said, if
everyone did that, a tie would be as unlikely as it is now in ordinary
Plurality.
So let's lay to rest this notion of MDDA having a problem with everyone
ranking all the candidates.
You continued:
I think his argument could be reworded slightly to be less
controversial. It's not that there's a universal or near-universal
desire to provide full rankings.
I reply:
That's for sure. I've just voted in an Internet presidential poll with 15
candidates. Ranking all of them was a bit of work. Even more so in the EM
presidential poll with 46 candidates. Few people will want to bother ranking
all the candidates when there are more than a few.
You continued:
A system that violates later-no-harm
therefore has a serious political liability in that regard.
I reply:
That's a strong statement, and it requires justification. Who says that
rightness requires that people should have no incentive to not rank
everyone?
You continued:
My personal belief is that satisfying later-no-harm (or at least
minimizing violation to rare instances) is highly desirable.
I reply:
All criteria are desirable. It's a question of choosing which ones one
considers most important, especially when it isn't possible to comply with
all of them. To you it's very important to encourage people to rank all the
candidates, with no incentive to do otherwise. To me it's more important to
assure people that there's absolutely no reason to bury their favorite. I
don't say that your standards are wrong. But remember that others' standards
aren't wrong because they differ from yours. There aren't right or wrong
standards. What's wrong is the notion that there are.
And, by the way, MDDA's SFC compliance gives some protection against LNH
failures, for people who rank the candidates they don't like. Its premise
conditions aren't at all implausible.
But you're right that it would usually be a better idea to not rank the ones
you don't like. Sure, I could help to give Bush a majority defeat from
Kerry, but why should I do that when I can just vote an Approval difference
against both of them by ranking neither.
But MDDA's SFC guarantee means that it doesn't do so much harm when the
giveaway progressives insist on ranking Kerry. They're failing to vote an
Approval difference between Kerry and their favorite, but they're still
contributing toward a possible majorilty defeat for Kerry. If you think
that's unrealistic that a majority would rank Nader over Kerry, consider
that Nader is usually the voted CW in nearly all presidential
rank-ballotingl polls.
Sure, Condorcet(wv) encourages ranking all the candidates, unless offensive
order-reversal is expected. But I found it a bit yucky to rank candidates I
don't like. I have no objection whatsoever to a method in which it's
strategically better to not rank disliked candidates.
You continued:
I
personally believe that getting people to think deeply about compromises
is how we get to a more civil state in politics. If people can be
jostled out of their comfort zone and consider the relative merits of
candidates who they might at first blush consider "evil", then perhaps
we'll truly get less evil candidates than the current batch who foment
partisan rancor.
I reply:
I disagree. Why is it better if people consider the relative merits of Kerry
and Bush, or McKain and Hillary Clinton, etc.? To talk of their relative
merits implies that there is a significant merit difference. Why waste time,
debasing oneself with concern about the merit-difference between meritless
candidates?
That won't give us less evil candidates, but if we continue trying to find
how one is better than another, then it tends to perpetuate their undeserved
success.
Discard the undeserving candidates. In Condorcet(wv), if you don't expect
offensive order-reversal, go ahead and strategically rank them in reverse
order of winnability, if you can hold your nose tight enough. That will
decrease the chance that one will win.
Blake and others have complained about that incentive and used it to argue
for margins over wv. But margins has much bigger strategy problems--major
defensive strategy need, to protect majority rule or the CW, as opposed to
relatively minor strategy incentive.
You continued:
Here's a related set of questions I've been meaning to ask:
1. Are the Later No Harm (LNH) criterion and the Sincere Favorite
Criterion (SFC) mutually incompatible?
I reply:
SFC stands for Strategy-Free Criterion. Doesn't MMPO meet both of those
criteria?
You continued:
2. Are LNH and the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC) mutually
incompatible?
I reply:
Doesn't MMPO meet both?
You continued:
3. Are LNH, SFC and FBC mutually incompatible?
I reply:
Doesn't MMPO meet all of those?
But regrettably, MMPO has a big problem, as Kevin pointed out.
Mike Ossipoff
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