[EM] Power Truncation

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

EM listmembers--

This is the last of 4 initial messages that I intend to send to the 
Condorcet mailing list, about MDDA, to introduce it, its advantages, 
properties, and possible enhancements, to the Condorcet mailing list:

I suggest that the best rank-method proposal is the ordinary MDDA statute 
language that I have already sent.

Deluxe MDDA would be a little better, but isn't really necessary.

Power truncation, which I'll define below, would be very useful, because its 
strategy is as simple as that of Approval when an acceptable/unacceptable 
situation exists. That's a situation when, as perceived by the voter, there 
are completely unacceptable candidates who could win. It could also be 
described by saying that the candidates are classifiable into two sets such 
that the merit differences within those two sets are negligible compared to 
the merit difference between those two sets.

With Approval, of course, under those conditions, one just approves (only) 
the acceptable candidates. It would be desirable for a rank method to have 
as simple as strategy as Approval does in an acceptable/unacceptable 
situation. That's only possible for an FBC complying method. MDDA can 
achieve that goal with the power-truncation option:

The voter has the option of marking a box on his/her ballot that indicates 
that every candidate whom s/he doesn't rank shall be treated as if that 
voter had ranked all of the other candidates over him/her.

Though power truncation, by making MDDA strategy as simple as that of 
Approval in an acceptable/unacceptable situation, would be valuable, I don't 
propose power truncation for a first MDDA proposal. For a first proposal, I 
propose MDDA,  in the plain and briefly-defined form for which I have sent 
the statue language.

Mike Ossipoff

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