[EM] Majority criteria

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

With RV, not only does a majority always have the power to make their unique 
favorite win, but they always have the power to do so without reversing any 
preferences.

In fact, more generally, if a majority prefer X to Y, then they have a way 
of voting that ensures that Y won't win, without any of them reversing a 
preference.

That's the Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion (WDSC). RV meets WDSC.

WDSC is met by RV, Approval (which is an RV version), wv Condorcet, and 
Bucklin. Probably a few other methods too. Most methods don't meet WDSC.

Sure, it would be nice if, by the mere fact of voting their unique favorite 
over everyone else, a majority could make it win. But, to meet that and a 
few other desirable criteria, one needs a pairwise-count method. 
Pairwise-count methods are more problematic to propose to the public and get 
enacted. I'm not saying it's impossible, because I'm aware that a state 
legislator is considering proposing Condorcet in his state.

Besides, if that majority really want to make their favorite win, then of 
course they can do that in RV. If that is their desire, then why should they 
give points to other candidates?

Yes, it would be nice if they could fully vote Favorite over Compromise, 
while fully voting Compromise over worst. If you want that then you want a 
pairwise-count method, and wv Condorcet is a good one. MDDA and MDDB are 
also good ones, more suitable than Condorcet for political elections, 
because they meet FBC.

Still, RV seems a much easier and more winnable proposal, due to its 
simplicly, public familiarity, and public populariy.

And Weak Majority Criterion compliance  and WDSC compliance do much to make 
up for RV not meeting MC.

Mike Ossipoff

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