[EM] Newbie de-lurks to propose a clone-proof Borda method

[Jobst Heitzig]

Welcome to the list, Ken!

You wrote:
> the fundamental problem with
> plain Condorcet is that it doesn't directly take into consideration which 
> position candidates are ranked in.

Well, I would rather say that this is the main *advantage* of methods
which consider pairwise preferences and/or approval scores instead of
rank positions, because the rank position per se has no significance at
all!

The fundamental problem of methods based on rank positions is that
position k on one ballot can mean a completely different thing than
position k on another ballot. In my opinion, rank positions must never
be confused with utilities or ratings!

However, I am quite eager to know what method you propose. Could you
please repost it since I seem to have missed your original posting?

Yours, Jobst