[EM] Not obviously untrue
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue May 31 21:08:50 PDT 2005
After I'd said that I wasn't going to read your postings, you sent one to my
I didn't expect to have to do this, but I've blocked you from my e-mail
address. And now, in case you have another e-mail account that I haven't
blocked yet, let me now make it clear to you that I don't want any more
e-mail from you.
I'll comment on this posting, a copy of which was sent to my e-mail address:
This isn't in reply to any subjct-line.
In what way obviously untrue? I'd been discussing MMPO's criterion
compliances. The discussion wasn't finished. For several days, I'd intended
to comment on MMPO's criterion failures. As I said in my posting about that,
any proposed method's criterion failures need to be addressed, and MMPO is
Maybe you think that it was necessary to find out about those criterion
failures from you. :-)
If I read and reply to the postings of people I've said that I've posted my
last reply to, then where's my reply to Markus's posting that continued the
subject line of the previous discussion?
Funnily enough, your statement above provides evidence against itself.
How is that? I knew that you'd posted because of the subject line.
(It clearly indicates that you read my "minmax is not a good public
election method" post, and that you were concerned with it in the writing
of your message, which addresses the same salient points.)
The "salient points" are three criterion failures: ICC, MMC, and CL. But
those are common knowledge, not something that could only be commented on in
reply to you. Anyone discussing the merits of MMPO would mention those
James apparently thinks that he was the only one who knew that MMPO fails
ICC, MMC, and CL So, if I commented on those criterion-failures, then I
must have found out about it by reading James' posting. :-)
One of the nice things about declaring that I won't reply to James is that I
don't have to read his postings. Reading the postings, so that I can reply
to them, is about half of the unpleasantness of the overall reply task.
There really is no reason to read what I don't reply to. It's a nice relief
to not have to display James' postings on the screen.
Commenting on MMPO's failures of ICC, MMC, & CL means that I wanted to
address MMPO's well-known criterion failures. It doesn't prove that I read
MMPO can fail ICC, by means of a fratricidal majority cycle. But
candidates in a clone-set are presumably rather similar. So how come, in
that ICC failure scenario, they can muster more votes against eachother
than againsts their genuine opponent?
Likewise with MMC. That majority prefer eachother's candidates to all the
others. And yet they contribute to greater vote totals against eachother
than against someone they all like less?
Unless you mean to imply that the majority faction should use equal
rankings, your question makes no sense.
You say that, but apparently can't justify what you sayj.
I didn't say that the scenario is impossible. I said it isn't likely. My
wording implied that it's odd, and I stand by that.
A cycle in MMPO that thwarts a mutual majority can happen as a result of
Improbably bad luck, sure.
and/or well-coordinated strategy on the part of the minority
Though I didn't read your posting, I read other people's postings with the
same subject-line, and so I can tell you that what you're saying has been
answered. You're repeating an already-answered statement.
You apparently want to say that the minority are sophisticated and organized
enough to engineer a strong majority cycle, but that the majority are too
unsophisticated and disorganized to be able to equal-rank. Now you've been
answered twice. But I don't expect that to stop you. But that's ok, because
I don't display your postings, and you aren't going to e-mail any more of
them to me.
Condorcet Loser? It must be a peculiarly popular Condorcet loser who has
the fewest people who prefer someone else to him. Not only is it unlikely
a Condorcet Loser, but suppose one did. It would be unaesthetic to elect a
Condorcet loser, but how disastrous would it really be to elect a
candidate over whom fewest people prefer someone else? Would Hitler, Bush,
or David Duke win MMPO?
Anyone would know that. Someone thoroughly disliked isn't going to be the
least unpreferred candidate. Someone so disliked that he is Condorcet Loser
isn't going to be the least unpreferred candidate. You can write an example
of that happening, but that doesn't mean that it will happen.
As with the majority-cycle scenario, I don't claim that the CL MMPO winner
scenario is impossible in the sense that an example can't be written.
It's not clear how this question supports your argument.
What can I say?
Yes, failure of MMC and CL might be pretty rare in MMPO. But why on earth
should we chance it when methods that pass MMC and CL use the same ballots
I've said this many times, but I'll repeat it for you again: Different
methods sometimes give different results. That's why we call them different
methods. And, because they give different results, they often meet different
criteria. Therefore, one chooses which criteria are more important.
Sometimes the choice of methods is influenced by how easily or likely will
be a criterion-failiure.
I've talked about the likelihood of MMPO failing ICC, MMC, CL, and GSFC.
MMPO meets FBC, WDSC, and SFC. With enhancements MMPO strictly meets SDSC,
ICC, MMC, GSFC, and Strong FBC.
Without enhancements, MMPO meets different criteria than wv and methods
related to wv. Remember, James, that your Cardinal Pairwise doesn't meet SFC
without an enhancement. MMPO, in plain form, meets SFC. It's a question of
which criteria you want to meet.
FBC and SFC vs ICC, MMC and CL, when MMPO's failures of those latter 3 are
FBC is the most basic guarantee to reassure the timid, and SFC is the most
ambitious guarantee for strategy-free voting, under the conditions for which
that can be guaranteed. Those make a good combination. Even unenhanced, MMPO
looks good in coimparison to Cardinal Pairwise.
But, with enhancements, MMPO has everything else beaten, including Cardinal
Pairwise with enhancement. AERLO, ATLO, and cycle collapsing don't make MMPO
meet Condorcet Loser. But when you have a method that meets everything else
that's important, one could inelegantly gain CL compliance by method
definition: Add to the definition of enhanced MMPO a provision that says
that if a Condorcet loser wins, then s/he is deleted from the ballots and
the election repeated.
Will that CL protection cause MMPO to lose FBC and Strong FBC. Maybe,
strictly speaking, and, if so, I wouldn't want to add it. I'd rather keep
FBC & Strong FBC. But if CL were more important to other people, then of
course that trade-off could be made. Of course, even then, an FBC failure
that only happens when it involves eliminating a Condorcet loser who wins
MMPO is one that will be very very rare, and probably not very important
even if it happened.
and are just as easy to promote?
You've got to be kidding. MMPO is incomparably easier to introduce, define,
promote, and implement than Cardinal Pairwise.
If we're able to get beyond IRV, then why
not use SD, Smith//minmax, beatpath, ranked pairs, river, etc.?
1. They aren't nearly as easily and simply introduced and defined to the
public as MMPO. They don't even come close in that regard.
2. They don't meet FBC. MMPO's FBC (and, when enhanced, Strong FBC) gives to
the more timid voters a guarantee that they have shown that they need.
As I said, Australian voters often bury their favorite, because they're
using Plurality strategy. And no one can assure them that IRV won't make
them regret that they didn't do that--because IRV can make them regret that
they didn't do that.
As I said, I recently observed someone voting in an Internet presidential
poll, and that person agreed that Nader was more honest than the Democrats
and had better polices. But that person ranked all the Democrats over Nader.
Lesser-of-2-evils. With Cardinal Pairwise I couldn't absolutely guarantee to
that person that that person could never regret not burying Nader lke that.
With MMPO I could absolutely guarantee that.
That's a guarantee that voters need, as has been shown by experience.
Aside from all that, though LNC isn't important to me, the fact that MMPO
meets it will help in discussions with IRVists.
There is no need to implement MMPO instead of SD. SD is just as easy to
I consider SD a good proposal. But not as good as MMPO. For one thing, SD's
definition mentions cycles. If you haven't talked to people who are
completely unfamiliar with voting systems, then you don't know the degree to
which something like that puts people off.
For another thing, the pairwise count methods other than MMPO, such as wv or
margins, need a lot of preliminary definitions. I e-mailed an RC definition
to a newspaper editor once, and he wrote back and said that no one at the
paper understood it. I'd thought that RP's brief definition would be
understood by everyone. But I'd left out all the preliminary definitons
without which someone new to voting systems won't understand most
It's necessary to say:
1. X beats Y if more people rank X over Y than rank Y over X.
2. If one or more candidates are not beaten, then they win and the count
3. Otherwise a "circular tie solution" is used to choose the winner.
Circular tie solutions will be defined after these preliminary definitions.
4. For the purpose of that circular tie solution, an instance of one
candidate beating another is called a defeat.
5. For the purpose of that circular tie solution, if X beats Y, the strength
of that defeat is defined as the number of people ranking X over Y.
[end of preliminary definitions (I hope)]
These preliminary definitions are what I left out when I sent my brief RP
definition to that editor. No wonder they didn't understand RP, without
Do you still think Cardinal Pairwise and wv are as easy to introduce and
define to the public as MMPO is?
, it's Smith efficient, MMC efficient, CL efficient, and Condorcet
Different methods meet different criteria. The lack of some criteria have
worse effect on people's voting than does the lack of other criteria.
Experience suggests that FBC is more necessary, in that regard, than Smith,
MMC, CL, ICC, or CC.
I don't know how to quantify IC failure, but I know that MMPO's
IC failure is worse than SD's IC failure. Trading Smith, Condorcet, MMC,
and CL for FBC and later-no-harm is a lousy trade.
Without enhancement, Cardinal Pairwise fails SFC. MMPO meets SFC without
So add that to the unenhanced trade.
And, enhanced, the trade is: FBC & Strong FBC vs CL. And CL failure is
easily avoided, when a method is good enough to justify adding a special
rule to avoid CL failure. How easily can you avoid letting Cardinal Pairwise
fail FBC and Strong FBC?
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