[EM] RE: approval and pareto

[Simmons, Forest]

If ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs, and alternative A pareto dominates alternative B, then B cannot have more approval than A.
 
If B has approval equal to A's, then the tie should be broken by random ballot.  In that case alternative A will beat B, since A is ranked higher than B on every ballot.
 
Therefore,  this version of Approval satisfies Pareto.
 
Forest
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