[EM] Dave on approval, ranked ballots

[Simmons, Forest]

>From his remarks below I think that Lomax would agree with me that candidate A in the following example would likely be better for the electorate than candidate M:
 
Sincere
55 M>A>>B
45 B>A>>M
 
On the other hand, M would be more likely to win the approval election, unless a significant percentage of the M supporters were to vote altruistically like Lomax, for A.
 
In either case, we get a good winner.
 
The case I worry about is
 
sincere
60 A>>B>C
20 B>C>>A
20 C>B>>A
 
where the corporate polls are reporting:
 
disinformation
40 A>B>C
30 B>C>A
30 C>B>A
 
In this case all of the pundits are going to encourage A supporters to approve B as well.  I'm afraid that most of the A supporters would fall for it.
 
That's why I think that there should be some standard or target that comes out of the primary or preliminary vote that sets the stage for Approval.  "Approve or Dare" or "Lottery Informed Approval" or some other source of binding (hence reliable) information.
 
Small groups could use repeated approval balloting where the scores accumulate so that manipulation is counter-productive.
 
Large groups could form a small subset of voters by random sample to choose a "target candidate."  Then this target candidate is the winner unless some other candidate gets more than fifty percent approval in the general approval election, in which case the candidate with the most approval wins.  Since the proceedings of the small group are public, the general voters get an idea of the relative strengths of the candidates, etc. before they vote.
 
Alternatively, the small group could designate candidates or other proxies to pick the candidate to be "targeted" in the general approval election.
 
The target could be a lottery, like the Condorcet Lottery or Democratic Fair Choice  lottery.
 
Forest

From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>
Subject: Re: [EM] Dave on approval, ranked ballots
To: election-methods at electorama.com
Message-ID: <6.2.1.2.0.20050728123903.02dd6d40 at mail.lomaxdesign.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed

At 06:44 PM 7/27/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> > It's a question of election philosophy.
>
>I don't agree with your perception. I don't believe an election method can
>find the candidate who is "most widely approved" unless we really do
>assume that
>voters are sincere, and use the same definition of "approve."

Yes. That's true. However, there is a clear definition of "approve," and it
is very simple: a candidate is approved if you contribute to the
candidate's possible election by marking an approval ballot for that
candidate, or by otherwise ranking the candidate above other candidates.

While there is no guarantee that this will actually pick the "most widely
approved" candidate, because of possible oddities in how voters will use
the method, it would seem likely to do so. Absolutely, if voters approve of
a candidate merely because they are afraid that another, even worse,
candidate might otherwise lose, there is quite a possibility of a failure;
this failure would have resulted from the voter's judgement that it was
better to have the better of two evils, and, indeed, this is not the same
as what we would colloquially mean by "approval," nor what we would want.
However, even here, even if many voters vote in this way, it *still*
remains likely that the result would be a more widely approved winner.

Note that no method is going to guarantee the desirability of results if
large numbers of voters vote insincerely.

>  Otherwise it seems
>to me that giving or withholding approval is just a strategic tool to get the
>best outcome for oneself.

That is one possibility, but there is quite another. Which is that some
voters might indeed prefer that a jurisdiction be governed with the widest
possible consent of the governed. I can say that I'd be among them!

In other words, I prefer that the widest number be satisfied than that I
personally be *most* satisfied. I consider the latter situation unstable
and insecure.


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