[EM] Dave on approval, ranked ballots

[Jobst Heitzig]

Can anybody cite a study showing cycles would be rare in "real"
elections with many candidates and truely ranked ballots (not 90% bullet
votes because of lazy voters)? This claim comes up again and again and
it seems to me that there is no evidence for this. At least my
simulations showed that when there is a set of closely tied candidates
and individual preferences are at least mildly independent then cycles
occur more and *more* frequently as the number of these candidates grows...

Dave Ketchum wrote:

> On Wed, 27 Jul 2005 00:24:55 +0200 (CEST) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> 
>> Dave,
>>
>> --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
>>
>>> My comparison of methods:
>>>      Approval - its backers like to brag, but it is not that simple -
>>> unlike Condorcet and IRV, voters CANNOT say:  I prefer Nader but,
>>> only if I cannot have Nader, give me Kerry as better than Bush.
>>>
>>
>> However, ranked methods won't always obey your request. Condorcet methods
>> and IRV will both sometimes take the vote "Nader>Kerry>Bush" and elect
>> Bush,
>> when if you had instead not ranked Nader, the method would elect
>> Kerry. That
>> is, the method ignores the fact that you said "If I cannot have Nader,
>> give
>> me Kerry."
>>
>> Condorcet methods will sometimes see the "give me Kerry as better than
>> Bush"
>> part and give the win to Kerry, when it could have gone to Nader
>> otherwise,
>> despite the fact that your vote says "ONLY if I cannot have Nader,
>> give me
>> Kerry."
>>
>> The freedom of expression that a ranked ballot gives voters is to some
>> extent an illusion.
> 
> 
> 
> Please give an example, but:
>      No IRV - let that be a separate project.
>      No cycles - likewise, unless you state that there is no problem
> without cycles being involved.
> 
>>
>> Kevin Venzke
> 
>