[EM] some questions about utility

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 10:45 AM 12/20/2005, James Gilmour wrote:

>This is very interesting, especially with regard to the election of 
>"assemblies" (used here as a generic word for
>councils, state legislatures, parliaments, etc) operating within a 
>"representative democracy".  At which level should
>the consensus operate?  Should the consensus operate among the 
>voters?  Or should be consensus operate within the
>elected assembly?

First of all, an assembly election by consensus *is* possible in 
certain special cases. But it generally requires a deliberative 
process wherein the electing group comes to agree on its 
representative. There is, however, another method for creating a 
representative assembly where every member is elected by a form of 
consensus, and that is proxy representation; I'm thinking in 
particular of delegable proxy, and members of the assembly having 
different voting powers in the assembly. Asset Voting (which is 
actually a form of delegable proxy operating under special rules) is 
a technique for accomplishing something approaching this where the 
assembly members may have equal voting power. Delegable proxy is 
simpler and more direct, but there might be other reasons to prefer 
Asset Voting.

>A voting system that sought to maximise the consensus among the 
>voters might well result in the exclusion from the
>elected assembly of representatives of some smaller, but significant 
>groups of voters.  Those voters would then have no
>voice in that assembly.

It could. However, delegable proxy has the opposite effect, 
especially if *voting* rights in the assembly are not restricted; 
i.e., the general membership may vote in the assembly (but not debate 
or enter motions except by permission). Thus the narrowing function 
of forming an assembly still functions, but individual voters remain 
able to be represented or, in fact, to vote directly. This is Direct 
Democracy with Delegable Proxy, it is, in fact, what 
beyondpolitics.org is currently working on.

>   On the other hand, if the consensus is to operate within the 
> assembly, the aim of the voting
>system could well be to maximise the diversity of representation 
>elected to the assembly, so that the greatest number of
>significant views might be directly represented.

Delegable Proxy accomplishes this to the maximum extent possible, I 
believe. Full rights in the assembly, when it became necessary, would 
be restricted to those members who represent a minimum number of 
members. Note, however, that this restriction is subject to approval 
by all the members, and could be changed, or suspended, by them at 
any time. At least in theory.

This is another advantage, by the way, of variable voting power, for 
it becomes possible to set the minimum number much lower that it 
would be set at with equal representation. I've considered schemes 
where the assembly size is set at a certain number, and, then, those 
in attendance who are the N most-highly-trusted proxies would have 
full rights. I'd assume that there would be a certain fluidity to 
this; but the idea is to keep full participation to a manageable 
number. The minimum number represented could be *much* less than the 
total number of represented members divided by N. Below that any 
proxies or sole members present would function through proxies with 
full rights.

>   If there is any parallel with the AA example, it is a consensus within
>the assembly, not a consensus among the voters.

While this is largely true, in theory, at least, delegates to the AA 
General Conference are chosen by a process which is not exactly 
consensus but which does generate greater minority representation 
than simple majoritarian elections would accomplish. Essentially, a 
2/3 vote is required to elect a delegate, according to the published 
materials. If after repeated balloting, no single delegate obtains a 
2/3 vote, the delegate is chosen by lot, I think from among the top 
two. Another way of accomplishing something even more broad, overall, 
would be a lottery system where *all* candidates were included in the 
lottery, with the chance of winning being proportional to the vote 
cast for the candidate. (Simply collect the ballots and draw one out 
of the box....) With a large delegate body, this would produce broad 
minority representation.

But delegable proxy is much simpler and practically guarantees broad 
representation. Essentially it avoids elections entirely, or at least 
it avoids elections for representatives. Officers may still be elected.

Further, delegable proxy, if the proxies are collected on a personal 
level (which I would strongly encourage, and, indeed, this is one of 
the reasons for "delegable" proxy, to make the collection of proxies 
on a small scale possible while still keeping high concentration of 
representation in large organizations), will function as a 
bi-directional communications system, where coordination and 
cooperation happen in a give-and-take. I'm working on a local 
application in a small New England town, Town Meeting government, and 
I've seen how substantial back-and-forth is necessary to develop a 
town consensus for new initiatives. Delegable proxy could speed that 
up and make possible broader effective participation. Note that the 
application would be for a Free Association, not for the town 
government itself. But if a well-connected FA comes into being, it 
could effectively become the hand that guides the official 
government, through advising the voters *and* the town.

>   I appreciate one has to accept the opposite conclusion in respect of
>single-winner elections (city mayor, state governor, etc), where you 
>have no option but to look for consensus among the
>voters.

Frankly, to my mind, systems of government based on single-winner 
elections are a formula for an eventually weakened sense of ownership 
on the part of the public. Few of us now think of the government as 
"us." It's "them," and, mostly, we don't trust "them." Politician is 
right up there with Used Car Salesmen, my apologies to used car salespersons.