[EM] Two approval ballot methods using approval opposition

[Chris Benham]

Kevin,

Kevin Venzke wrote:

>A philosophical question would be whether there is any justification
>for electing someone other than the Approval winner when we're using
>approval ballots. 
>
And  the philosophical answer would be that it isn't. A  fundamental 
standard is that  the results
of  the voting method must be justifiable on the assumption that the 
votes are sincere.
You can't do nothing except collect approval information and then elect 
someone who isn't the
Approval winner because you make some "guess"  about voters' rankings 
based on the assumption
that there is a political spectrum.

The least bad of  these three methods, MAMAO, fails   Irrelevant Ballots.

Modifying one of your examples slightly, we see that the other two fail 
the Plurality criterion.

35% A
29% AB
05% BC
31% C

As in your example they both elect B, but A has more first-place votes than
B has votes in total.


Chris  Benham