[EM] range voting fix try #2 by Rob Brown

[rob brown]

On 12/10/05, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> wrote:
>
> At 04:33 PM 12/9/2005, rob brown wrote:
> >BTW, I'm still waiting for your response my description of how range
> >voting is subject to vote splitting, and about how Duvergers law
> >would apply to Range just as it would plurality.  (in particular I'd
> >hope you'd look closely at my 2000 presidential election
> >example)  Nor has the Range voting camp addressed why they reject
> >the basic tenets of economics and game theory (i.e. people tend to
> >independently pursue their own self interest, and systems optimized
> >for people doing this tend to be the most stable).  Till I hear
> >satisfactory answers for these, I don't expect to be joining a
> >bulliten board dedicated to one election method that I am convinced
> >is supremely broken.
>
> Mr. Brown comes in like gangbusters to "fix" Range Voting, but isn't
> interested in a list which specifically discusses Range Voting.... Weird.



I joined it.  And posted.  But still, I prefer discuss it in a general
election methods group.  My reasoning for wanting to "fix" range voting has
less to do with range voting than election methods in general.  My current
thinking is that if you address all the problems with Range (and Approval,
for that matter), you'll find yourself pretty much back at Condorcet, which
is as close to perfect as I have yet seen.  To me, the problems with
Condorcet are 1) a bunch of extremely subtle issues that only show up on the
most contrived cases and 2) that it isn't particularly good at showing
results output (i.e. bar charts and such).  My goal is to help fix the
latter.

There is a series of assertions about Range which Mr. Brown has made.
> They are not well-founded. If he focused on one of them, we might
> actually get somewhere. But there are so many.... Rather than respond
> to the questions above -- which are out of context and not
> particularly easy to answer without searching back to get that
> context, or they incorporate assumptions, of the classic "when did
> you stop beating your wife" variety.
>
> There is no Range Voting camp.


I meant Warren, you, and Jan.  The ones I have seen to advocate Range voting
and post in election methods.

There is a math professor who is
> promoting Range Voting and has done a fair amount of work with it,
> and there are a few people who have tried or who are trying to help
> the effort. There are people who want to discuss elections methods
> endlessly. And there are a few people who actually want to improve
> elections and who are acting in that direction. To act, one generally
> must choose a course of action. Some people, I suppose, live with the
> belief that their chosen course is absolutely the best possibility,
> but others merely recognize that they have to start *somewhere*.


I'm ok with that.  I also agree with forming a strategy.  For instance, as
much as I find problems with approval, I would agree to get behind it if I
thought it had momentum.  I'd even get behind range if.....well I'm having
trouble coming up with something.  :)   I am ok with its interface.  My main
interest in election reform is removing the conflict between sincerity and
strategy that voters find in plurality.  Range does little to remove that,
so you don't have my support at present.

So, instead, I'll focus on a comment from Mr. Brown's first "Fixing
> Range Voting" series.
>
> First of all, voting Approval Style isn't gaming the system. It is
> merely deciding to sharpen distinctions. It's a choice that voters
> can make. However, it is far from "everyone's best strategy."


I disagree.  I think except when you really have no clue how others will
vote, it is always strategic to vote approval style.

Maybe we define strategy differently.  My definition says that no matter how
weakly you want to pursue your goal, it is still your goal, and it makes no
sense to not pursue it as strongly as possible if there is no cost to you to
do so.


> There is an assumption on the part of some EM people that recommended
> voting strategy is that course of action which will maximize the
> possibility of election of one's favorite, or, if not that, then
> one's next favorite, etc.
>
> However, in my view, an intelligent voter is one who recognizes the
> importance of broad consent to government. The goal of elections is
> *not* to choose the favorite of some faction, but to create a
> government by consent of the people. Some argue with this, and,
> indeed, our present systems don't do that very well at all. Condorcet
> methods, while based on a clear intuitive concept, can only go so far
> to reach this.


I will admit I come at this from a strong Game Theory background, and what
you say is counter to everything I stand for.  Sorry.  I think there is a
very big difference between individual interests and societal interests.
Sometimes you can align the two, and that is wonderful when you can.  But if
you want to design a system that expects people to put the common interests
above their own...well, you've lost me.

I know the whole cynical "people are selfish" attitude of game theory and
classical econmics is offensive to many.  We want to believe people are
good.

I in no way want to celebrate human selfishness (a la Ayn Rand).  But I do
think that systems designed to work when people independently pursue their
own interests, are the ones that work. Period.

Just as Approval is black and white, yes and no, and thus cannot
> express nuances, Condorcet merely extends a binary relationship to
> include all the candidates (or a truncated set).
>
> It's true that if your goal is simply advancing your own cause,
> regardless of the effect on others, on society as a whole, you may
> wish to vote Approval in a Range system.


Yes.  And I'm not saying that you should expect everyone to be that type,
that only cares about their own cause.

I'm saying if you design the system so that there is no conflict between
advancing your own cause and the benefit of sociey as a whole, you have a
stable system.
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