[EM] Alright, next try. Range voting fix, version 2.

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 08:49 PM 12/8/2005, Scott Ritchie wrote:
>Here's an example where it will never resolve:
>
>Voter 1:
>A: 100
>B: 40
>C: 0
>
>Voter 2:
>A: 45
>B: 0
>C: 100
>
>Voter 3:
>A: 0
>B: 100
>C: 60
>
>A simple Condorcet cycle.

Three voters, each with a different first place preference among 
three candidates. In FPTP, this is a three-way tie. No Condorcet 
winner. Range, interestingly enough, does produce a winner, and I'd 
suggest that -- in such an artificially weird election -- the Range 
winner is probably the best that can be chosen from among the three.

Range totals
A:145
B:145
C:160

Looking at why C wins, it is because C was rated higher by a B voter. 
Given the ratings, C *is* the best winner.

It has been alleged that Range is not good if voters exaggerate. 
However, suppose that these voters are exaggerating. They can't 
exaggerate any more in the minimum and maximum ratings: normalization 
would make no difference in this election. The only question is how 
to rate the middle candidate. And it seems intuitively obvious to me 
that the optimum rating is the expected utility of that candidate's 
election, compared to the min and max candidates. How, exactly, do 
you "exaggerate" the middle? If you exaggerate minimum, you could 
cause the middle candidate to lose to your least favorite. And if you 
exaggerate maximum, you are failing to indicate your preference for 
your favorite.

Range is a system that works with sincere voters, and that, in fact, 
appears to me to punish insincere voters: insincerity risks having 
contributed to an undesirable outcome.

Readers may know that I'm not a fan of elections at all, I prefer 
non-electoral representation, i.e., proxy or delegable proxy. 
However, I still support polling prior to decision-making with 
respect to office-holders, and Range seems to me to be a very good 
method for that.

Further, there is the interim. In that interim, which might be a very 
long time, we will still have elections. Strategically, I'd prefer to 
promote Approval, for various reasons, but Approval Plus may be 
politically possible (Approval plus an indication of favorite: if 
used to determine the winner, it's a truncated Condorcet method with 
three ranks: Favorite, Approved, and Disapproved; if not used to 
determine the winner, it is used for informational purposes and 
public campaign financing). And Range is a refinement of Approval; 
but it takes a more complex ballot.