# [EM] Alright, next try. Range voting fix, version 2.

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Fri Dec 9 16:18:24 PST 2005

```At 08:49 PM 12/8/2005, Scott Ritchie wrote:
>Here's an example where it will never resolve:
>
>Voter 1:
>A: 100
>B: 40
>C: 0
>
>Voter 2:
>A: 45
>B: 0
>C: 100
>
>Voter 3:
>A: 0
>B: 100
>C: 60
>
>A simple Condorcet cycle.

Three voters, each with a different first place preference among
three candidates. In FPTP, this is a three-way tie. No Condorcet
winner. Range, interestingly enough, does produce a winner, and I'd
suggest that -- in such an artificially weird election -- the Range
winner is probably the best that can be chosen from among the three.

Range totals
A:145
B:145
C:160

Looking at why C wins, it is because C was rated higher by a B voter.
Given the ratings, C *is* the best winner.

It has been alleged that Range is not good if voters exaggerate.
However, suppose that these voters are exaggerating. They can't
exaggerate any more in the minimum and maximum ratings: normalization
would make no difference in this election. The only question is how
to rate the middle candidate. And it seems intuitively obvious to me
that the optimum rating is the expected utility of that candidate's
election, compared to the min and max candidates. How, exactly, do
you "exaggerate" the middle? If you exaggerate minimum, you could
cause the middle candidate to lose to your least favorite. And if you
exaggerate maximum, you are failing to indicate your preference for

Range is a system that works with sincere voters, and that, in fact,
appears to me to punish insincere voters: insincerity risks having
contributed to an undesirable outcome.

Readers may know that I'm not a fan of elections at all, I prefer
non-electoral representation, i.e., proxy or delegable proxy.
However, I still support polling prior to decision-making with
respect to office-holders, and Range seems to me to be a very good
method for that.

Further, there is the interim. In that interim, which might be a very
long time, we will still have elections. Strategically, I'd prefer to
promote Approval, for various reasons, but Approval Plus may be
politically possible (Approval plus an indication of favorite: if
used to determine the winner, it's a truncated Condorcet method with
three ranks: Favorite, Approved, and Disapproved; if not used to
determine the winner, it is used for informational purposes and
public campaign financing). And Range is a refinement of Approval;
but it takes a more complex ballot.

```