[EM] Alright, next try. Range voting fix, version 2.

[rob brown]

On 12/8/05, Scott Ritchie <scott at open-vote.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2005-12-08 at 18:40 -0800, rob brown wrote:
> > Well, your example is not only a Condorcet cycle, but a pure 3-way tie
> > in condorcet terms.
> >
> > It is effectively:
> > A>B>C
> > B>C>A
> > C>A>B
>
> Then make it 5 A>B>C, 4 B>C>A, and 3 C>A>B, and watch the same thing
> happen.


I'll have to try that out.  Doesn't really surprise me really.  Still I
think that idea of collecting voter preferences in the Range voting way is
ok in theory, but if tabulated in the way proposed by the range voting
crowd, it doesn't make sense.  Likewise, Approval voting would be ok if it
didn't require voters to have such knowledge of strategy and of the current
likelihood of various candidates being elected.  This way isn't perfect, but
its better in that regard (i think).  I put this method forward mostly as
food for thought.

> So, no condorcet method could resolve it either as anything but an
> > out-and-out tie. (right?)  I would not expect this to do so either --
> > at least not in its simplest implementation.  In fact, I'm pretty
> > happy that it indeed met my prediction of behaving similarly to
> > condorcet methods, in that it gets stumped on the same data sets. :)
>
> Your method IS a Condorcet method.  If there is a Condorcet winner, and
> your method doesn't select him in one round, then a majority of voters
> can have their threshold altered such that he wins.


I would sort of expect that it is.  Of course, I tend to be a bit of a fan
of condorcet, so that's a good thing in my mind.

Anyway, thanks for your insight.

-rob
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