[EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 18, Issue 7

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sun Dec 4 19:03:14 PST 2005


Warren,

--- Warren Smith <wds at math.temple.edu> a écrit :
> no my "prefeence" for utility does NOT trace to my "belief that many
> voters
> will be sincere."  (Venzke delusion about me.)  It also does NOT arise
> from the idea that voters who want to downweight their votes, can do so,
> thus leading to better utility election results (although that
> undoubtably is
> generally true).

This is useful to know, since it means that the range voter's greater
ability to express himself (relative to the approval voter) isn't part
of why you feel social utility is a useful measure. That means there's
no reason to discuss only range, since approval should justify the use
of social utility to the same extent that range does.

> Because: in my computer simulations & comparisons of different voting
> systems,
> voters were allowed to be strategic & insincere, and range votign had
> the best utility under those circumstances even with 100% strategic
> voters.

I did simulations comparing sincere Schulze(wv) voting with various
scenarios for approval voting:
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-March/012292.html

The results tend to be pretty close. Approval was most impressive when
all voters know which candidate maximizes utility, and vote strategically
as though they believe this candidate will win with 90% probability:

5 candidates:
in 25.38% of trials, approval winner had higher utility
in 4.81%, Schulze winner had higher utility
in 69.81%, same winner
+1.55 average difference in utility of approval winner over Schulze
winner (scale being 0-100)

7 candidates:
in 31.03% of trials, approval winner had higher utility
in 4.49%, Schulze winner had higher utility
in 64.48%, same winner
+2.07 average difference in utility of approval winner over Schulze
winner (scale being 0-100)

I think this is impressive in some respects.

> And because: in my computer sims, nobody downweighted themselves - all
> voters
> voted 100 for their favorite and 0 for their most hated.  Always.

I assume that you did test approval strategy.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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