[EM] Why Utility is more important than "transvestite Inversion Property" - reply to Venzke, Gilmour

[James Gilmour]

>Smith Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 5:17 PM
> Reply to Venzke & Gilmour about Social Utility
> 
> Gilmour & Venzke have again expressed the opinion that Social 
> Utility is merely yet another voting system criterion, on a 
> par with Monotonicity, Favorite Betrayal, Condorcet, etc, and 
> therefore my preference for it is unwarranted, mysterious, 
> biased, and/or somehow cantankerous of me.

Smith tries an old debating trick of attributing to me many things I have never said.  And he fails to address the main
that was made.  I don't get hung up on this criterion or that.  I certainly have no concern about monotonicity in public
elections.


> It says social utility (Bayesian Regret, is my name for it, 
> but essentially the same thing) is the right way to compare 
> voting systems and trumps the others. 

Social utility may well be a useful tool for comparing voting systems.  But it has recently been suggested here that the
logical outcome of the social choice approach is that voters can (should ?) contribute differently to the determination
of the result of an election depending on how strongly they feel about the various candidates.  Those who feel very
strongly about the differences among the candidates, shout loudest about them and use the biggest numbers to show the
strength of their preferences, would (should ?) contribute more to the determination of the outcome.  I think not, in a
democratic society.

I may earn five times more than you.  That could be taken as a proxy for the fact that society values me five times more
highly than it values you.  Should my vote count for five times as much as your vote in the local election?  Should I be
allowed to mark my preferences from 1 to 50 while you are allowed to mark your preferences only from 1 to 10, when those
absolute values will go into the counting algorithm?  That may maximise the social utility according some criterion
assessed on a suitable scale, but it has no place in a democratic society.

My neighbour is a slob who takes no interest in politics or public affairs, knows nothing about the current issues and
does not look at any of the candidate literature before going to vote.  I on the other hand, am extremely well informed
about politics and the current issues and read all the candidate literature that comes through the door before an
election.  So my vote will be extremely well informed, certainly compared with that of my neighbour.  Does that mean
that my vote should carry more weight and should contribute more to the determination of the outcome of the election
than the vote of my neighbour?  That may maximise the social utility according some criterion assessed on a suitable
scale, but it has no place in a democratic society.

James Gilmour