[EM] favorite betrayal in Condorcet(wv, =permitted, no partial votes)

[Adam Tarr]

Two responses:

1) As I and others have said before, it is absurd that you attempt to draw 
conclusions about the long-term effects of an entire election method from 
one example involving a three-way tie.

2) The reason this example does what it does is because, in the case of an 
EXACT tie, the tiebreaker considers the margin of defeat. So yes, you can 
get margins-condorcet-esqe incentives to bury your favorite in the case of 
an EXACT tie. In a real, public election, this is utterly irrelevant since 
the probability of an exact tie is vanishingly close to zero.

-Adam
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