[EM] Re: DMC / 2-party domination
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Aug 30 08:51:55 PDT 2005
Ted,
--- Araucaria Araucana <araucaria.araucana at gmail.com> a écrit :
> On 29 Aug 2005 at 12:59 UTC-0700, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >> Here is another question - will DMC lead to 2-party domination, or
> >> not? To really answer this, it would help to understand optimal
> >> voting strategy in DMC, which is probably beyond reach.
> >
> > The argument that some ranked methods lead to 2-party domination is
> > based on the possibility that voters will use "favorite betrayal" to
> > ensure that they don't sink their most viable frontrunner.
> >
> > So it seems to me that, using this reasoning, any method which fails
> > Mike Ossipoff's "favorite betrayal" criterion will lead to 2-party
> > domination.
> >
> > DMC doesn't satisfy the "favorite betrayal" criterion.
> >
>
> I disagree.
>
> I think that favorite betrayal occurs in the primaries, before the
> general election slate is even drawn up.
>
> TTFN,
What do you disagree with?
If you disagree that DMC fails FBC, I don't have a failure example at
the moment. But I would be shocked if DMC satisfies FBC, since DMC is a
Condorcet method.
When I read your second paragraph, you seem to be arguing that even methods
which satisfy FBC will fail it if there are primaries. But that doesn't
seem to be a disagreement with anything I said.
When I referred to "the argument..." I was referring to Warren's argument.
Perhaps that's where you disagreed.
I don't know what "TTFN" means.
Kevin Venzke
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