[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

[Chris Benham]

Adam,
You wrote (Fri.Aug.12):

>* OK, in the interest of fairness, here is one winning-votes Condorcet
>strategy that is arguably superior to sincerity.  This is from Blake
>Cretney.  It's pretty simple: if you have a sincere tied ranking, it's
>better to rank those candidates in some random order than to rank them
>equally.  So in stead of ranking three candidates tied for fourth,
>rank them 4, 5, 6, (in some order) and kick any candidates below
>fourth down two slots.  There are situations where this strategy can
>hurt you, but on average (aggregating over a large number of voters
>with similar preferences) it will not.
>
>  
>
I  don't  think you have that quite right. In  the "defeat-dropper" 
style winning-votes Condorcet methods you refer to, if  the voter 
sincerely ranks some candidates
equal-bottom,  then the voter's best zero-information strategy is to 
strictly rank them all at random (i.e. to  "random-fill"). In addition 
to that, if  above-bottom
equal-ranking is allowed, then if  the voter has a sufficiently large 
gap in his/her sincere ratings  he/she should  equal-rank above that gap.


Chris  Benham