[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

[Adam Tarr]

I'll now respond to Warren's earlier message.

> I did not say it was the best strategy.  I merely claim it is
> an obvious strategy, which *sometimes* is best, 

In all seriousness, when?  Make some simulations that demonstrate
this, or at least show some examples.

I don't debate that the "more-favored front runner first, less-favored
front runner last" strategy is useful (often optimal) in Borda, but I
can't easily imagine a scenario where it is useful in Condorcet.  Nor
have I ever heard it advocated.  It does not seem "obvious" to me.

> that many members of the public will adopt.

This seems like an unsupportable assertion, particularly given your
assertion that voters will tend toward honesty unless given a
compelling strategic reason to do otherwise.  (An assertion that I
agree with wholeheartedly, by the way.)

> Comparing honest-voter condorcet-LR versus strategic-range=stategic-approval,
> yes, the former does win, at least in the 2 example election scenarios
> with 5 candidates on the CRV site.   However honest-condorcet-LR does
> better in one
> and worse in the other case shown, versus honest-voter-approval, and
> worse in both cases versus honest-voter-range.

I don't debate that, in the rare cases where voters can be trusted to
be both honest and expressive, that range voting maximizes total
satisfaction.  A good example of that would be the voting of a small
committee whose votes are subject to public scrutiny.  But in large
public elections with secret ballots, the urge to push all your
rankings to 99/0 and vote strategically is huge.

This contrasts with the best Condorcet methods, where strategic voting
is less important than in basically any other method known.  This is
why I am and remain such a fan of winning votes Condorcet methods:
there are very few glaring strategic issues, and voting honestly is
usually very close to an optimal strategy.

> Consulting the larger data compilation at
> http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/voFdata
> we find that honest-voter condorcet-LR is usually (always?) better than
> strategic-range=strategic-approval.
> 
> However, I do not see why this is "the most accurate comparison."
> Seems to me the most valid comparison is honest v honest or
> strategic v strategic.   

Again, your "honest range" voting is, in my opinion, very unrealistic.
 Especially after an election or two, voters will get the clue. 
Imagine if voters vote sincerely by range, and we end up with a
2000-type scenario.  By 2004, they would learn their lesson and vote
(Kerry, Bush) at (0,99) or (99,0).  Your "strategic range" voting, on
the other hand, is pretty spot-on, and actually jives nicely with some
of the extended "approval strategy" threads that were posted here
about a year back.

The situation is nearly completely reversed when it comes to
Condorcet.  Your "honest Condorcet" is fairly realistic, since there
isn't really a strategy that has been shown to be consistently better
than an honest vote in winning votes Condorcet.*  And your "strategic
Condorcet" strategy is a strategic nightmare - basically never the
optimal approach.

So in my opinion, "Honest Condorcet" against "strategic
range"/"strategic approval" is absolutely the most realistic
comparison your simulation provides.

-Adam

* OK, in the interest of fairness, here is one winning-votes Condorcet
strategy that is arguably superior to sincerity.  This is from Blake
Cretney.  It's pretty simple: if you have a sincere tied ranking, it's
better to rank those candidates in some random order than to rank them
equally.  So in stead of ranking three candidates tied for fourth,
rank them 4, 5, 6, (in some order) and kick any candidates below
fourth down two slots.  There are situations where this strategy can
hurt you, but on average (aggregating over a large number of voters
with similar preferences) it will not.