[EM] encourage dishonesty / range / WDS reply to robla

[Rob Lanphier]

On Thu, 2005-08-11 at 21:54 -0400, Warren Smith wrote:
> To a certain extent RL's whole argument at the start of this email could
> be said to be "I prefer methods that are hard to understand because then
> others will not undestand them either and everybody will just give up
> on trying to find the best strategy and hence will (as a last resort)
> just be honest."    If you think about that argument, I do not think you will
> like it.

No, my argument is this:  in a well-designed Condorcet method (e.g.
Schulze), there's not a "better than sincere" strategy that isn't:
*  Dangerous
*  Confusing
*  Easily countered if the other side catches on

I think your studies show that instituting a Condorcet method means that
the accompanying education effort should be vigorous.  It means warning
people, "hey, if you try any funny stuff, you're likely to get burnt".
But part of what makes democracy is that people learn enough to govern
themselves as part of the process.

An example of this was the 2000 election.  Nader voters arguably made a
strategic error, allowing Bush to beat Gore.  However, Nader didn't do
so well in 2004.  There were obviously other factors involved; many
people knew what would happen and wanted to send a message, so the
situation isn't entirely analogous, but the point is that the electorate
will learn from strategic errors.

>   Also, voters do not need to find the best strat, all they need
> is the find a strat they think likely to be as good or better than honesty.
> I think in IRV that is exactly what they do do, and that is exactly why every IRV
> country is a 2-party dominated country.  I think it likely that every condorcet
> country will also be a  2-party dominated country for the exact same reason.

As I recall from discussions on this list, there are plenty of
simulations that show that IRV elections tend to resolve to two clusters
away from the political center (i.e. two-party system) thus not bucking
Duverger's Law any better than plurality.  The fact that this happens in
the real world is not a surprise, given the theoretical results.  In
fact, if I recall correctly, it's been shown that IRV tends to reward
more extreme candidates over time than plurality does.

However, the simulations show that this doesn't happen for Condorcet
methods.  They tend to resolve to the center, as do Approval and Range,
for that matter.  I can't remember who it was that ran the numbers, but
hopefully they are reading now (or someone who remembers is reading now)
and will chime in with more details on this.

Regardless, the fact that real-world IRV elections result in two-party
systems is unconvincing evidence that the same would hold true for
Condorcet methods.

Rob