[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Thu Aug 11 12:36:10 PDT 2005


>> robla:
>> My point was Condorcet only considered <,>,= relations WITHOUT numerical magnitudes,
>> just yes of no, as votes, hence the distinction between my 1st + 2nd
>> defintions of the Condorcet concept, dd not occur in his mind.
>
>That would be /the/ definition of the Condorcet winner.  I sincerely
.hope that you remove the extremely misleading proposition that Range
>Voting is somehow Condorcet-winner compliant.
>
>Your tactic a very similar tactic to one used by many Condorcet
>advocates which I also object to.  Condorcet fails the "Independence
>from Irrelevant Alternatives" criterion (IIAC), made famous by Kenneth
>Arrow in his Nobel prize winning theorem.  Many Condorcet advocates have
>tried to dance around this issue by redefining IIAC to be "Local IIAC",
>and pointing out that some Condorcet methods pass "Local IIAC", /before/
>confessing that they fail IIAC as defined by Arrow.
>
>I personally believe that Local IIAC is a valid criteria, but I also
>believe that Condorcet advocates need to be honest and direct when the
>question comes up.  Simply stating, "Condorcet methods fail IIAC.
>However, ..." can be just as convincing if the argument is a good one.
>For the record, I believe that Local IIAC is a very valid substitute for
>IIAC, for reasons we don't need to rehash just now.
>
>Similarly, I would ask that you are just as up-front about your new
>criteria.  Name it something new, e.g. "Weighted Condorcet Winner".
>However, please do not spread disinformation about the classic
>definition of "Condorcet Winner".


I have now rewritten the condorcet writeup on the CRV site because the old
version had bigs and was not as good.

But it does not correct the so-called dishonesty you said.
But I am not being dishonest.

It was not dishonesty, it was simply reaching a higher level of
mental sophistication.

Condorcet did not realize anything other than <,=,> relation voting was possible.
If that is the only kind of voting you have ever heard of, then the TWO definitions
of "condorcet method" I gave become equivalent.
If however we try to generalize the Condorcet concept
to allow more general kinds of voting (such as RV)
then it suddenly dawns on you that the definition of "condorcet method"
now (when we generalize it to handle these systems) can be generalized in two
different ways.   I have fully honestly (unlike you) mentioned both ways.

You have by mentioning only one way, only been partially honest.
OK?  (You rubbed me the wrong way there.)

Now the CRV site fully honestly discusses what happens under BOTH of
these definitions.  Under def1, range already is a condorcet method.  Under def2,
range is not condorcet but has some advantages over all condorcet methods.

Nothing dishonest.  Just the truth.

-wds     http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/RangeVoting.html







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