[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

[Paul Kislanko]

Rob, please lose the invective and the misleading statements:

"Your tactic a very similar tactic to one used by many Condorcet
advocates which I also object to.  Condorcet fails the "Independence
from Irrelevant Alternatives" criterion (IIAC), made famous by Kenneth
Arrow in his Nobel prize winning theorem.  Many Condorcet advocates have
tried to dance around this issue by redefining IIAC to be "Local IIAC",
and pointing out that some Condorcet methods pass "Local IIAC", /before/
confessing that they fail IIAC as defined by Arrow."

Well, Arrow's Nobel Prize-winning theorem was that EVERY method MUST fail
one of his four criteria. So Condorcet fails IIAC? Everybody knows it must
fail one or another. 

If the argument is that IIAC is more important than the other 3 criteria,
please list the criteria that your favorite method (whatever it is) fails to
satisfy, in the interest of your post's concern about other folks' failures
to disclose everything.

 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com 
> [mailto:election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com
> ] On Behalf Of Rob Lanphier
> Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 12:17 PM
> To: Warren Smith
> Cc: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Center for Range Voting Formed
> 
> On Thu, 2005-08-11 at 09:29 -0400, Warren Smith wrote:
> > [Rob Lanphier wrote]:
> > > Here's a counterexample:
> > > 
> > > 41 ballots:
> > > A:10
> > > B:3
> > > C:0
> > > (Ranked equiv: A>B>C)
> > > 
> > > 10 ballots:
> > > A:5
> > > B:10
> > > C:0
> > > (Ranked equiv: B>A>C)
> > > 
> > > 10 ballots:
> > > A:0
> > > B:10
> > > C:5
> > > (Ranked equiv: B>C>A)
> > > 
> > > 39 ballots:
> > > A:0
> > > B:3
> > > C:10
> > > (Ranked equiv: C>B>A)
> > > 
> > > Range Voting result:
> > > A:460
> > > B:440
> > > C:440
> > > 
> > > Condorcet winner: B
> > > B beats A: 59-41
> > > B beats C: 61-39
> > > A beats C: 61-39
> > > 
> > > Running the "erase the candidate" filter over this 
> election doesn't
> > > change the fact that A beats B in a Range election, even 
> though B is the
> > > Condorcet winner by a clear margin.
> ...
> > So your "B is the condorcet winner" does not imply "B is 
> the beats all winner"
> > according to WEIGHTED votes.   
> > 
> > My point was Condorcet only considered <,>,= relations 
> WITHOUT numerical magnitudes,
> > just yes of no, as votes, hence the distinction between my 1st + 2nd
> > defintions of the Condorcet concept, dd not occur in his mind.
> 
> That would be /the/ definition of the Condorcet winner.  I sincerely
> hope that you remove the extremely misleading proposition that Range
> Voting is somehow Condorcet-winner compliant.
> 
> Your tactic a very similar tactic to one used by many Condorcet
> advocates which I also object to.  Condorcet fails the "Independence
> from Irrelevant Alternatives" criterion (IIAC), made famous by Kenneth
> Arrow in his Nobel prize winning theorem.  Many Condorcet 
> advocates have
> tried to dance around this issue by redefining IIAC to be 
> "Local IIAC",
> and pointing out that some Condorcet methods pass "Local 
> IIAC", /before/
> confessing that they fail IIAC as defined by Arrow.
> 
> I personally believe that Local IIAC is a valid criteria, but I also
> believe that Condorcet advocates need to be honest and direct when the
> question comes up.  Simply stating, "Condorcet methods fail IIAC.
> However, ..." can be just as convincing if the argument is a good one.
> For the record, I believe that Local IIAC is a very valid 
> substitute for
> IIAC, for reasons we don't need to rehash just now.
> 
> Similarly, I would ask that you are just as up-front about your new
> criteria.  Name it something new, e.g. "Weighted Condorcet Winner".
> However, please do not spread disinformation about the classic
> definition of "Condorcet Winner".
> 
> Regarding the example:  59 people out of 100 prefer B to A.  Under the
> principle of "one person, one vote", it's extremely difficult to argue
> that A should win.
> 
> Rob
> 
> 
> 
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