[EM] DMC / 2-party domination

[Kevin Venzke]

Warren,

--- Warren Smith <wds at math.temple.edu> a écrit :
> Here is another question - will DMC lead to 2-party domination, or
> not?   To really answer this, it would help to understand optimal
> voting strategy in DMC, which is probably beyond reach.

The argument that some ranked methods lead to 2-party domination is based
on the possibility that voters will use "favorite betrayal" to ensure that
they don't sink their most viable frontrunner.

So it seems to me that, using this reasoning, any method which fails Mike
Ossipoff's "favorite betrayal" criterion will lead to 2-party domination.

DMC doesn't satisfy the "favorite betrayal" criterion.

> here is another:  consider the horrible "DH3 pathology" described at
> http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/DH3.html
> 
> which afflicts Borda and many Condorcet methods...   does it also afflict
> DMC?  Again answering this requires some understanding of voting strategy in DMC.
> However, if the voters use the "obvious" exaggeration-plan
> (for A-supporters:  A>D>B>C  and approve A only)  then it seems
> to me under DMC D wins, right?  This suggests DMC is killed by the DH3 pathology.
> And by "killed" I mean bad news, you really should regard this extremely seriously.

When you rank frontrunners insincerely low, you're "burying" them. So Jobst
mentioned this as point 17:

>> 17.  It is resistant to the burying strategy that plagues some
>> Condorcet methods.  This is related to reason number 9.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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