[EM] Re: ATLO, defection, method/criterion model

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Thu Apr 21 22:56:01 PDT 2005


I've just written an almost complete reply to this posting, only to have it 
get deleted, presumably because of some key (not the delete key) or key 
combination that I pressed accidentally near the bottom of the keyboard. So 
I'll start over. I guess it's a good idea to copy what one is writing every 
5 minutes, or after every new paragraph, so avoid losing the entire e-mail.

Kevin--

You said:

Where do you get "the better"? What I'm saying is: Suppose B is a lesser 
evil,
and hopes to persuade C voters to vote in such a way that the election won't
be thrown to A when B voters truncate. In IRV this means the C voters can't
vote for C. In WV+ATLO this means that the C voters can't use ATLO. I think
the C voters will find the latter proposal easier to swallow.

I reply:

Oh, ok, I misunderstood you, because I thought that you were saying that it 
was somehow an advantage when more drastic defensive strategy is needed. Of 
course you didn't mean that.

By the way, in every presidential election in the U.S., the Democrat 
preferrers succeed in persuading nearly all of the progressives to bury 
their favorite by voting for the Democrat. The progessives don't say "That's 
too drastic, so we won't do it." They're told that they need to and so they 
bury their favorite. So actual voting shows that lesser-of-2-evils voters 
will use the most drastic favorite-burial strategy if they're told that they 
need to.

You say:

So you call it "offensive truncation" when, under WV, the B voters refrain
from giving C a preference? That sounds unnecessarily negative to me.

I reply:

Even when it's done with larcenous intent?

But truncation won't take victory from a majority-supported CW in wv. 
Truncation isn't really a problem in wv. Your example shows that it can 
sometimes be a defection strategy, and that's how the topic came up.

You'd said:

>My interpretation of election methods is that all of them have a ranked
>ballot component (allowing full, partial, and equal ranking).
>

I replied:
>
>...Excuse me...but they don't. All methods don't havae a ranked ballot 
>component.

You say:

I'm not going to argue with you about whether methods can be interpreted
as ranked ballot methods.

I reply:

Good, because I didn't say that nonrank methods can't be interpreted as rank 
methods. Obviously you can interpret anything in any way that you want to.

I was merely pointing out that your interpretation is counterfactual. 
Nothing wrong with that. One way that an interpretation can be useful is if 
it's true or likely to be true. But certainly that isn't the only reason why 
an interpretation can be useful. Of course counterfactual interpretations or 
assumptions can be useful. So I was just ruling out one particular way that 
your counterfactual assumption or interpretation could be useful.

You say:

When the physical ballot allows all preference orders, then they're the 
same,
because no change needs to be made to make the "assumed" ballot valid. I
don't agree that this is a different rule.

I reply:

No, it's just a rule to use an imaginary ballot instead of the actual one, 
unless the method is a rank method.

It's a rule that treats rank methods as special and favors them. As I said, 
it amounts to saying "Nonrank methods fail this criterion".
You'd said:

>This is why I don't feel compelled to include Steve Eppley's requirement in
>votes-only Minimal Defense that all preference orders must be accepted
>
I replied:
>
>No, you just say the same thing in a different wording. I'll get to that 
>soon, below.

You say:

And that's basically what I said, except that you cut that part off of your
quote for some reason.

I reply:

Ok, then it's agreed that the rankings interpretation is just another 
wording of "Nonrank methods fail this criterion."

I'd said:

>You falsely assume that Plurality is a rank method.

You replied:

This sentence makes no sense unless it is either "true" or "false" that
Plurality is a rank method. .I'm not saying it's "true" that Plurality is a
ranked method. I'm saying I interpret all methods to be ranked methods

I reply:

It is either true or false that Plurality is a rank method. In particular, 
it's false that Plurality is a rank method. Plurality is not a rank method, 
by the pretty much universally accepted meaning of that term.

I understand that you aren't saying that Plurality is a rank method, and 
that you use your interpretation because it's useful rather than because 
it's true.

I'd said:

>So, when you say that Pluraity fails your votes-only Minimal Defense, what 
>you really mean is that imaginary-rankings Plurality fails it.

You replied:

Now you're just being stubborn. My interpretation of Plurality doesn't 
change
it into a different method.

I reply:

Ok, but I didn't say it out of stubborn-ness.  I was just commenting on one 
possible interpretation of what you'd said. We can rule out that 
interpretation of what you said. Of course it's true that if the URF is 
added to the beginning of Minimal Defense, ordinary Plurality fails that 
criterion.

You say:

Well, I think this definition is confusing because it isn't clear that the
ranking might contain part of the counted ballot marks.

I reply:

I clearly said that the imaginary ranking was in addition to the actual 
counted ballot marks. But maybe you want to somehow mix the imaginary and 
actual ballots. Now I admit that I have no idea what your criteria system 
is.

I'd said:

>But the trouble with that is that some people are going to find the 
>criteria, and they'll have no way of knowing that you want it understood 
>that they begin with URF.

You say:

That's a valid point. Hopefully other people do not have a major problem
understanding me when I quote criteria.

I reply:

That depends on you. It depends on whether your give to them a complete 
definition, or instead expect them to use ESP to determine the complete 
definition.

You say:

I consider your "counterfactual" argument very weak.

I reply:

What could be your problem with "counterfactual". You said yourself that you 
aren't saying that Plurality is a rank method. We agree on that, don't we? 
Then any assumption or interpretation that Plurality is a rank method is 
counterfactual. That isn't necessarily a derisive word, because 
counterfactual assumptions can be useful. But any assumption or 
interpretation of Plurality as a rank method is counterfactual.

You continue:

I don't agree that it is "awkward"; it allows criteria to be written very
concisely. The "cast ballots" don't have to be referred to at all, and there
is no intelligent "translation" process from the intended ballot to the cast
ballot. It can be assumed to be arbitrary.

I don't understand why you say "roundabout."

I reply:

I meant that your rankings interpretation criteria are awkward and 
roundabout compared to my criteria. Preference is central to strategy. In 
fact, we wouldn't even bother voting if we didn't prefer some candidates to 
others. But, based on the practice of journal authors, or having heard it 
from Markus, you've decided that criteria shouldn't mention preference.

To make Plurality fail Condorcet's Criterion and Minimal Defense, etc, 
without mentioning preference, it's necessary to go to ridiculous extremes. 
To say that one's criteria don't apply to nonrank methods. Or to declare 
that nonrank methods fail the criteria. Or to include in your criteria a 
counerfactual assumption that all methods are rank methods. Maybe that 
doesn't sound roundabout to you.

But consider my criteria. SDSC for instance. Plurality fails SDSC not 
because I say "If all methods were rank methods...". Plurality fails SDSC 
and WDSC for a simple, natural, obvious and expected reason: The majority 
who prefer X to Y can only make Y lose if enough of them vote for X. But 
maybe X isn't the favorite of half of them. Obviously, then, it would be 
easy to write an example in which the only way that majority could make Y 
lose is by some voting X over their favorite, reversing a preference.

That's simple. And it's an obvious description of the situation that voters 
face in our acual elections.

I don't need "Nonrank methods fail this criterion" or "This criterion 
doesn't apply to nonrank methods", or "If nonrank methods were rank 
methods..."

That's why I say that your ranking-interpretation is awkward and roundabout.

You say:

Instead of "URF" I'm going to use the term "RI" for "ranked interpretation."

I reply:

Fine. So will I. Especially since URF isn't what you mean, and I don't know 
what you mean.

Unlike James, I believe in using somone's own term for a criterion or 
proposal of theirs. So "RI" it is.

You say:

[referring to my statement that RI is just a rewording of "Nonrank methods 
don't pass"]

That isn't true. If it were true, then it wouldn't be possible to write many 
RI
criteria that Plurality passes.

I reply:

How many have you written? Post their definitions.

You continue:

Yet Plurality satisfies the Plurality criterion,
Clone-Loser, Later-no-harm, Later-no-help, Participation, Mono-raise...

I reply:

Have you written RI versions of those criteria? The one of those that I've 
heard of is Participation. How would you write RI Participation?

No, the fact is that there's no need for RI in criteria that Plurality is 
expected to reasonably pass. RI is only needed to keep Plurality from 
passing criteria that you don't want Plurailty to pass. RI is nothing but a 
rewording of "Nonrank methods don't pass".

For instance, Participation is passed by Plurality, and it also makes no 
mention of preference. Participation says:

Adding to the count one or more ballots that vote X over Y should never 
change the winner from X to Y.

[end of Participation definition]

No need for RI. But how would you right the RI version?

I'd said:

>Let's look at Approval & Plurality with URF votes-only Minimal Defense:

You say:

I agree that either with Steve's complete rule, or using RI, Approval and
Plurality both fail votes-only Minimal Defense.

I reply:

My point wasn't that Pluralitly fails it. My point was _why_ Plurality fails 
it.

I'd said:

>What would be your URF votes-only version of WDSC?

You reply:

Well, I'm sure you won't let me define your criteria for you

I reply:

Nice try. If you wrote an RI votes-only criterion that gives the same 
answers as WDSC, that wouldn't be my criterion. Can you or can you not write 
one?

You continue:

, and also I
don't use any version of WDSC, so I don't know.

I reply:

You wouldn't like methods that fail WDSC. Anyway, I didn't ask you to write 
it because you use WDSC. I asked you to write it to show how (or if) your 
criteria system can deal with the task of matching WDSC's answers.

WDSC is a good test for your criteria system, and for your claim that RI is 
more than "Nonranked methods don't pass". That's because Plurality fails 
WDSC, and Approval passes WDSC. That means that "Nonrank methods don't pass" 
won't do here. And that suggests that RI won't do either.

And that shows a deficiency, a lack of applicability, of your RI system of 
criteria.

So can you or can you not write an RI votes-only criterion that matches 
WDSC's answers?

You continue:

However, since methods are defined by their results given cast ballots and
not sincere preferences, a votes-only version of WDSC must be possible, if
difficult to use.

I reply:

Is that why you can't write one?

I'd said:

>Notice that it gives special status and mention to a particular balloting 
>mode.

That's because it can encompass most other modes.

I reply:

It doesn't encompass CR.

You continue:

It would be straight-forward
to adapt RI to also accept cardinal ratings.

I reply:

Is that why you don't do so? Even though your RI system is only half defined 
if it doesn't apply to CR?

You continue:

Then "RRI" criteria could be written
which would then be applicable to all methods.

I reply:

It could, but you don't write it.

Kevin, your RI system isn't defined. All you've given to us are some vague 
sketches. I have nothing against poetry, but you've got to state definitions 
that are precise and unambiguous, and as concise as possible. You could use 
my defintiions as a model. You've given us nothing approaching the 
completeness and precision of my criterion definitions, and their supporting 
definitions. Until you do, your RI criteia aren't defined.

That means that when you speak of Minimal Defense, you don't know what you 
mean. That's right, when you don't write precise unambiguous definitions for 
it, you don't know if you know what you mean.

I'm not singling you out. It isn't just you.

If I sound confrontational, it's because sometimes, maybe usually, progress 
requries confronting the lack of progress. It's necessary to say "The 
emperor has no clothes". Or "The voting system academics have their heads up 
their ass."

Mike Ossipoff

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