[EM] Re: why ranking should be allowed for approved candidates only

[Araucaria Araucana]

On 17 Apr 2005 at 14:28 UTC-0700, Russ Paielli wrote:
> I also suspect that ranking of unapproved candidates is likely to be
> very strategic anyway -- shedding little light on the true
> preferences of the voters. Voters are less likely to vote sincerely
> on candidates they dislike than candidates they like. I personally
> would probably just "bury" the unapproved candidate that I thought
> had the best chance of winning.

Condorcet methods don't give a large advantage to burying, in general.
Please think through your argument.

>
> By only allowing the approved candidates to be approved, we can
> significantly simplify the procedure for both the voter *and* the
> equipment manufacturer. And we can do so at very little "cost" in
> terms of voting "expressibility." If you are serious about actually
> getting a new voting system adopted, I urge you to reconsider
> allowing ranking of unapproved candidates.

Hi Russ,

The strategic ability to rank below the cutoff is what enables DMC/RAV
to discourage defection cases like this:

   27: A>>B
   24: B (truncates >A preference)
   49: C

Without that strategic disincentive, voters in this election might
simply bullet vote and you end up with C.

If the ballot has to be simplified, 3 approved + 2 disapproved ranks
are pretty simple.  This allows a voter to rank 3 choices as

    1 2 3
    1 2 4
    1 4 5

to move up the approval cutoff.  Or as grades,

   A B C
   A B F
   A D F

I would be happier with a 3-choice ballot (approval implied) than the
current single-vote, but I worry about creating a system that
regresses to the status quo.

Ted
-- 
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