[EM] LNHarm and ATLO

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Kevin!

You wrote:

> Can ATLO make it so that given the following sincere preferences, the
> B>C faction has no incentive to bullet vote?
> 
> 49 A
> 24 B>C
> 27 C>B
> 
> Under WV, the B>C voters can get B elected if they vote only for B, whereas
> they give the election to C if they give C a ranking.

DFC gives C 53%, B 47% probability of winning here, assuming all ranked
candidates are approved of.

> 
> My conclusion is that there is no way to satisfy SDSC and address the
> defection problem without electing C at least as often as B on the following
> ballots:
> 
> 49 A
> 24 B
> 27 C>B

I'm not sure whether your conclusion is true, but at least DFC again
gives C 53%, B 47% probability of winning here, assuming all ranked
candidates are approved of. Hence the B voters have no incentive to
truncate.

If the 27 vote C>>B, A gets elected with 100%, hence the C voters have
incentive to approve of B also, which I consider a good thing.

Yours, Jobst