[EM] Re: Definite Majority Choice, AWP, AM

[Araucaria Araucana]

Summary of discussion:

Ted (AKA Araucaria) things AWP could do a better job of resisting
strategic manipulation in some cases, but doesn't think it is as easy
to explain to the public.

James things they are equally difficult to explain and that relative
merit should rule the discussion.

I think we are two different planes that can never intersect.  But all
of my posts thus far have been directed toward finding a strong public
proposal, so I can't let the methods stand on their technical merits
alone.  So James, before you try to once again push CWP and AWP on
technical grounds, answer this:

I can explain DMC in three simple sentences:

   Eliminate any candidate defeated by any other higher-approved
   candidate.

   The remaining candidates form what we call the Definite Majority
   Set.

   The winner is the single undefeated candidate in the Definite
   Majority Set.

This is, IMO, simple and comprehensible to most people, though they
may argue the benefit of such a procedure and may worry (possibly with
just cause) about its vulnerability to manipulation.

Before replying once again with the same restatement of your opinions,
could you address these points?

- Approval Sorted Margins (AKA Approval Margins Sort?) appears to pick
  the same winner as Approval Margins or Approval-weighted Pairwise,
  at least in the examples given by you and Chris Benham.  But it has,
  IMO, a simpler implementation.  Could you examine that method in
  comparison to AWP?

      http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins

  (to digress slightly, I think the name "Pairwise Sorted Approval by
  Minimum Margin" or something of that sort might be more
  descriptive).

  Just to be clear on why I think ASM might be marginally more
  feasible but not AWP or CWP:  it's the extra pairwise array.  Do I
  have to explain further?  Chris Benham's Approval Margins proposal
  doesn't have an extra pairwise array, but I have yet to see an easy
  explanation for it.

- The Definite Majority Set has a nice ring to it.  It gives a
  favorable standing to non-winning members of that set, which always
  includes the Approval Winner.  The AWP Smith Set won't always
  contain the Approval Winner.  Can you find some alternate definition
  of the AWP winner that allows higher approved candidates (including
  the Approval Winner) to 'lose with honor'?

- James, I read your paper on CWP, about 6 months ago.  I appreciate
  that you put a lot of work into them.  But their technical nature
  and PDF format render them somewhat inaccessible to even
  election-methods list members.  I think your technical ideas have
  great merit, but you still need to sell me on implementation.  Why
  not try putting together an electowiki page.  If you're going to
  promote CWP, then design a ballot to go with the page.  And then
  discuss examples.  You can always link in your articles as External
  Links.

  The worst that might happen is that others could clarify your
  ideas. ;-)

-- Araucaria

On  2 Apr 2005 at 19:20 UTC-0800, James Green-Armytage wrote:
> James G-A replying to Ted, on the subject of AWP and DMC...
>>
>>
>>I agree that AWP (have you decided to pick between RP, Beatpath or
>>River?) 
>
>	No, I haven't chosen, nor do I feel the need to choose. I
>consider all three of these base methods to be very good, and I see no
>particular reason to limit the definition of CWP or AWP by choosing
>one over the other.
>
>
>>does a better job in this particular case, and all else being
>>equal, I would be happy with an AWP proposal.
>>
>>But all things are not equal.  How do you explain to your 80 year
>>old auntie about ordering the defeats, or that RP sometimes gets a
>>different result than Beatpath or River?  If you can show that AWP
>>always causes the 3 strong pair-ranking methods to get the same
>>answer, I would be convinced.
>
> 	This doesn't make sense to me. Are you saying for example that
> people will look askance at beatpath if they know ranked pairs to be
> equally good, and that they will look askance at ranked pairs if
> they know beatpath to be equally good? I doubt it.  I think that all
> three methods are about equally good. If we pick beatpath, people
> who like ranked pairs are likely to be happy, and vice versa. Also,
> if the proposal is based on ranked pairs, and I am trying to explain
> the method to someone who is not comfortable with complex voting
> theory, I have no need to explain beatpath and river to them. All I
> have to do is explain ranked pairs.
>>
>>Until then, I think DMC or some variant is the Condorcet method with
>>best chance of public acceptance.
>
> 	That's your opinion. My opinion is that if DMC and AWP are
>roughly equal in explainability, and that any method that combines
>some other ballot with a ranking ballot will be more difficult from a
>superficial standpoint than a method like sequential dropping
>(wv). Hence, if such superficial considerations are intense, both DMC
>and AWP are likely to be beyond reach. If the public is open to more
>complex methods, they are just about as likely to entertain one
>method as the other. Once we've reached that point, the important
>question is which method offers more benefits as an
>organizing/decision-making tool. I continue to argue that AWP should
>be chosen over DMC because it provides substantially more stability
>against tactical voting.  If we are ever able to do some serious
>focus group research comparing ordinary people's reaction to the
>different methods, while treating each one fairly, and it turns out
>that DMC does substantially better, I will accept your public
>acceptability argument. Until then, I suggest that my opinion on the
>relative public acceptability of the methods is as valid as yours,
>and that further discussion should focus on the relative merits of
>the methods in practice.

-- 
araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com