[EM] nkklrp at hotmail.com

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

James--

You said:

	Let's say that there is a man named Irving, who sometimes punches you in
the face with no provocation. However, he doesn't do any more damage than
that, and if he doesn't feel like punching you in the face, he won't do it
even if you try to provoke him.
	Let's say that there is a woman named Marge, who is quite gentle if you
don't provoke her, but if you do provoke her, she can do some terribly
violent things... crack open your head with a baseball bat, cut your
throat, cut off your fingers. And yes, she'll punch you in the face
sometimes, too.
	Let's say that there is a man named Waverly. If you don't provoke him, he
is gentle. What is he capable of, if provoked? Will he ever do anything
worse than punch you in the face? How often are people likely to provoke
him?


I reply:

That's really unfair to Marge & Waverly. WV & Margins won't elect a 
Condorcet loser, in their better versions, and are good by Pareto.

It's scurrilous to imply that Marge and Waverly will hurt you more than 
Irving will.

I'm talking about non-PC versions of wv & Margins.

Sure PC can elect a Condorcet loser, but it's pessimistic to worry about 
hopeless bottom-end situations like that. I'm more interested in electing 
the CW when there is one, and abiding by majority wishes. And, when PC 
elects a Condorcet loser, that's a curiously popular Condorcet loser-- one 
who has fewer people preferring someone else to him/her than anyone else 
does.

And it's the top-end considerations that give or avoid strategy problems, 
not the danger of electing a Condorcet loser. Strategy problems are my 
concern, and should be the concern of all of us, because of how they can 
result in complete concealment of what the voters want.

Obviously Margins has a lot more problems than wv.

So there's no reason to believe that Marge or Waverly punch harder than 
Irving does.

You say:

But when there are more than 2 winnable
candidates, widespread truncation could create limitation/distortion in WV.

I reply:

...and IRV can then easily have its automatic undesirable results.

You continue:

	However, the two-viable-candidate case is an important one to look at if
we're interested in comparing WV and IRV.

I reply:

Neither has its problems under those conditions. As I said, and as you 
agreed, wv doesn't have an offensive order-reversal problem when there are 
only two viable candidates.

You continue:

It is possible that WV performs
well in all or nearly all of the scenarios where IRV performs well.

I reply:

Yes, in the case of the 2-viable-candidate case. And in 1-dimensional 
spatial examples, or anytime the CW is between the others, it takes a 
plurality to succeed with offensive order-reversal. So, then, so far it 
looks as if wv doesn't have problems where IRV doesn't, for the most part.




If
that is the case, then there is no argument for IRV over WV (assuming a
Smith-efficient WV). This is an interesting area for further inquiry: are
there any general scenarios where IRV performs well but WV performs poorly?
>
James:
>	But anyway, yes, Condorcet methods (including WV) do have a problem that
>IRV doesn't have, because they fail LNH
Mike:
>Maybe I neglected to tell you that I'm not interested in the question of 
>whether, by some way you define "new problem", wv has a new problem. I 
>didn't say that before?

	Hard to say. You wrote "...it's meaningless to say that wv brings a new
problem.The loss of a CW, or the violation of majority wishes, is the same
undesirable result in wv as in Plurality or IRV, but in wv it takes much
more to make it happen, and it takes less to protect against it."
	I interpreted this to mean that Condorcet does NOT bring a new problem.
Perhaps I misunderstood. Anyway, we can probably agree that the question
of whether Condorcet methods add a "new problem" depends on exactly how
one defines "new problem", and leave it at that.

Mike:
>You say that you don't repeat, but what do you call that? You've told me 
>many times that wv is vulnerabale to burying. Every time you say that, I
>say this: The undesirable results that can happen due to "burying" in wv 
>will often happen in IRV and Plurality without anyone using any offensive 
>strategy at all. Remember the gentleman who isn't vulnerable to false 
>mother-insult reports?
>And then I add this: The difference? IRV and Plurailty will give those 
>undesirable results automatically, on their own, while in wv they're a 
>result of offensive order-reversal. Additionally, in IRV and Plurality, 
>those undesirable results can be prevented only by defensive 
>favorite-burial, while in wv they can be prevented by mere equal ranking. 
>And, in fact, mere truncation is enough to deter the offensive strategy
>that could otherwise cause those undesirable results.
>I've answered that statement for you about twenty times now.

	And although you may not believe me when I say this, I do understand your
point, and have understood it since the first time that you stated it. You
have to understand that I am trying to reply directly to this point, not
ignoring it.
>
James:
>	I call your "majority wishes" definition the "WV-defined immune set".
Mike:
>why do you feel a need to rename what I define?

	That's fine. I will refer to it (when I do) as "Mike's majority wishes
definition" (or "your majority wishes definition"), and to your majority
rule definition as "Mike's majority rule definition." I won't call your
majority rule definition "majority rule", because I think that you define
majority rule too narrowly (as we discussed).

Mike:
>you can't elect a Condorcet loser unless you fail to elect a CW, and you 
>can't violate preference Pareto unless you violate majority wishes. Your 
>worse results tend to be things that can only happen when my undesirable 
>results happen.
>Your goals are just a lot more modest than mine. Where I want to elect
>the CW, you want to elect anyone but the Condorcet loser. Where I want to
>avoid violation of majority wishes, you will settle for only not violating
>Pareto. There's nothing wrong with being willing to settle for less.

	You've misunderstood my point. Yes, you can't violate Condorcet loser,
Pareto, or do anything else really nasty, if you elect the CW when there
is one, and choose from the Smith set otherwise. So if you resolve not to
violate the sincere Smith set under any circumstances, then you don't have
to worry about that other stuff either. However, that is easier said than
done. Strategy in Smith-efficient methods (especially margins) can
potentially not only violate sincere Smith, but violate these other things
as well. Whereas IRV will routinely violate Smith and Condorcet, it is
virtually assured that it won't do this other stuff, and it is virtually
assured that it will elect a CW with >1/3 of the first choice votes.
	Do you see what I'm saying? Of course my goal is to keep the result
within the sincere Smith set. Basically, I'm just saying that as we
transition from IRV to a Condorcet system, we potentially lose a certain
amount of safety from really nasty results that IRV affords even with a
devious electorate, and so we have to assess our particular Condorcet
proposal to make sure that it won't do anything really nasty under
strategic conditions. Choosing WV instead of margins is probably a big
help, but we should examine WV very carefully just to be sure.
	I keep saying that my burying argument applies more strongly to margins
than to WV. I hope that you appreciate this. I've given examples where the
last choice of 90% of the voters has a significant chance of winning in
margins. I'm not sure if WV is likely do anything really nasty as a result
of the burying strategy; all I'm saying is that it is a question that
needs to be asked. This is a good direction to look in next: what are the
worst results that WV can produce under heavy voter strategizing? What are
the strongest CW's that can be successfully buried in WV?
	Do you understand what I'm saying? Please try. And if you don't, please
ask me to clarify, rather than assuming that I don't know what I'm talking
about. This dialogue won't be productive if you constantly assume the
worst about my level of understanding and spasmodically hurl insults at me
(like "imbecile"). I'm not an imbecile, and if you can't recognize that
fact, please don't waste my time by addressing any further messages to me.
I'm trying to engage you in a calm, serious discussion regarding specific
issues that I am generally curious about. I intend this to be a process of
discovery, rather than just a process of argument. I hope that you can
join me in such a discussion.

Sincerely,
James

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