[EM] Re: ATLO, defection, method/criterion model

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Kevin--
You said:

I have a doubt about ATLO. Assuming that the C voters use ATLO, then on
these (same) ballots:

49 A
24 B (withheld C preference)
27 C|B

A is elected. But in IRV, it's always the case that A is elected here, since
there is no ATLO. So it seems to me that in this scenario, IRV is more
effective than WV+ATLO in encouraging B voters to give C a preference.

I reply:

That's odd, that you'd say that, since ATLO in wv is completely effective in 
giving the B voters incentive to not truncate. You say that with IRV there's 
no need for ATLO, because the co-operation-defection dilemma is gotten rid 
of without ATLO? That's real great, but IRV has other deficiencies. Getting 
rid of that particular problem without ATLO isn't important enough to 
justify giving up all that must be given up when using IRV.

You continue:

Of course WV+ATLO is better in that the C voters don't have to consider
whether to order-reverse. But it seems to me that this should also make it
easier for the B voters to persuade the C voters to vote as the B voters
wish, compared to the same situation in IRV: B voters don't need to convince
C voters to abandon C; only to not use ATLO.

I reply:

Ok, you're not serious. You're wating your time and mine with a practical 
joke. You now claim that the more of a drastic a giveaway is needed as a 
defensive strategy, the better, because it's more difficult to persuade 
voters to use the strategy. So, then, for you, the more drastically 
insincere a defensive strategy is, the better. Well, that's good, because it 
means that we've found a fundmanetal basis for our disagreement on that. Now 
that that has been accomplished, there's no need for further discussion 
about that.  There's no need for us to discuss ATLO, my criteria, or wv any 
further, because we've found that we have completely opposite goals, on a 
fundamental matter. When the source of disagreement has been found, as it 
now has been found, there's no need for further discussion.

You continue:

What do you think: Given the sincere preferences in this scenario, does
IRV misbehave when the B voters truncate?

I reply:

I"m going to tell you something that you didn't know: Offensive truncation 
isn't a problem in IRV. I couldn't get James to understand this, and maybe I 
won't be able to get you to understand it either: Even though IRV doesn't 
have a problem with offensive truncation, or offensive order-reversal, the 
same undesirable results that offensive order-reversal and (much less often) 
offensive truncation can cause in wv are present in IRV, _even when no one 
is using any offensive strategy!_

I should just start posting the same FAQ each time.

You continue:

The approach I prefer towards the defection problem does not require failing
votes-only Minimal Defense.

I reply:

You forgot to say what approach that is. IRV? Though IRV can avoid the 
defection problem, it has worse problelms that wv doesn't have. And wv 
nicely avoids the defection problem via ATLO.

I'd said:

>Would you mind telling me again in what situations you believe that your 
>votes-only Minimal Defense works better or gives a fairer or more 
>acceptably right answer than SDSC does? Do you say that votes-only Minimal 
>Defense doesn't apply to Plurality, or do you apply it to all methods and 
>say that Plurality passes?

You say:

I'm not convinced that it's a good idea to elect A on the above ballots. I'm
not convinced it would help the defection problem much

I reply:

...except that it completely gets rid of the defection problem in wv

You continue:

; actually, I suspect it
could occasionally create a very bizarre result, due to but not intended by
the voters using ATLO.

I reply:

Every strategy can cause an undesired result if the strategy is based on 
incorrect information. You said that your favorite proposal is Simpon-Kramer 
(all pairings). That method has every problem that wv has, and more, 
including unintended results when its strategy is based on incorrect 
information. The only difference is that your Simpson-Kramer
will have such problems more often. More about Simpson-Kramer later, when 
you unveil it as your favorite proposal.

As I said before, co-operation/defection situations are pretty easy to 
recognize.

You continue:

My interpretation of election methods is that all of them have a ranked
ballot component (allowing full, partial, and equal ranking).

I reply:

...Excuse me...but they don't. All methods don't havae a ranked ballot 
component.

You continue:

When a criterion
says "if some voter votes in X manner," this refers to this component.

I reply:

Which rank component--the ballot's actual one, or the one that you're 
assuming. Or are those two rank components the same on rank ballots? Meaning 
that you have different rules for rank ballots and other ballots.

You continue:

(This
component isn't necessarily completed sincerely.) When the ballot format of
the method restricts the input of the ranked component, or has additional
components (such as an approval cutoff), it has to behave properly 
(according
to a given criterion) no matter how the unrestricted ranking may be changed
to be accepted as a valid ballot.

I reply:

Come again??

Presumably you mean that the imaginary ranking is voted according to the 
criterion's premise, and that the actual not-imaginary nonrank ballot marks 
could take any form.

You continue:

This is why I don't feel compelled to include Steve Eppley's requirement in
votes-only Minimal Defense that all preference orders must be accepted

I reply:

No, you just say the same thing in a different wording. I'll get to that 
soon, below.

You falsely assume that Plurality is a rank method. So, when you say that 
Pluraity fails your votes-only Minimal Defense, what you really mean is that 
imaginary-rankings Plurality fails it.

Let me suggest a better way to do that:

The Universal Rankngs Fiction (URF):

With non-ranked methods, in addition to whatever ballot marks are actually 
allowed and counted on the ballot, if the voter were also allowed to make 
one and only one ranking on the ballot (even though it isn't counted and 
even though it in fact isn't provided for or allowed on that method's 
ballot), then the following criterion should be met:

[end of URF definition]

URF is a statement that should be explicitly written at the beginning of 
each of Kevin's criteria. Sure, Kevin, you could say that URF should be 
understood to be at the beginning of all of your criteria,even if it isn't 
actually written there. But the trouble with that is that some people are 
going to find the criteria, and they'll have no way of knowing that you want 
it understood that they begin with URF.

If URF is dealtwith in that way, as part of your criteria, instead of just 
vaguely saying that it's your interpretation of the methods, then it has 
validity. But that doesn't make it an elegant approach to criteria.

It's counterfactual, awkward, and roundabout.

As I said above, when the criterion refers to rankings, URF is nothing but a 
statement that nonrank methods fail the criterion. No different from what 
Steve said.

Let's look at Approval & Plurality with URF votes-only Minimal Defense:

If a majority rank X over Y, and don't rank Y over anyone, then Y shouldn't 
win. Well, if they do that in Approval or Plurality, it doesn't mean a damn 
thing, as far as the outcome is concerned, because it isn't counted. On the 
actual ballot, the not-imaginary one, voters, within your premise, can vote 
any way they want to. The example-writer can have them voting any way the 
chooses. There's no way that Approval or Pluralitly could pass, given those 
facts. As I said, writing the criterion's premise in terms of rankings, and 
having URF, is nothing but another wording of Steve's statement that nonrank 
methods fail the criterion.

What would be your URF votes-only version of WDSC?

That URF criteria system is an awkward, inelegant, un-uniform, 
patchwork-contrived mess.

Notice that it gives special status and mention to a particular balloting 
mode.

My criteria make no mention of balloting modes, and recognize no balloting 
mode as having special status.

My criteria are uniformly applicable, and, unlike the URF criteria, are 
completely uniform in their treatment of methods and balloting modes.

Blake objected to my criteria because they mention preference, which Blake 
said is an emotional state. But my criteria don't depend on preference as an 
emotional state. They don't depend on "prefer" meaning anything, as I 
discussed earlier.

For the purpose of my criteria, "prefer" could mean what it means inour 
ordinary  use, or it could mean something else, or it could mean nothing at 
all.

For those who want a definition, though, I've posted 3 definitions of 
"prefer", one of which is a precise, abstract definition.

Choose whichever meaning you prefer.

But look at the absurd lengths to which people will go in order to write 
criteria that don't say "prefer".

And, in your URF system, what would be your votes-only version of WDSC?

to be contd.

Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar – get it now! 
http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/