[EM] Kevin-- ATLO & LNHarm

[Kevin Venzke]

Mike,

--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> wrote:
> You continue:
> 
> Can ATLO make it so that given the following sincere preferences, the
> B>C faction has no incentive to bullet vote?
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Yes. If the C voters appy ATLO below C, and rank C 1st and B 2nd, with their 
> ATLO line between C and B, then the B voters will have no incentive to 
> bullet vote.
> 
> Of course if the C voters and B voters aren't sure which of {B,C} is the CW, 
> and neither wants to elect A, and neither wants to be had by the other, then 
> both the B voters and the C voters should rank B and C, in sincere order of 
> preference, applying ATLO immediately below their favorite.

That's an interesting approach. I wonder if it's monotonic?

> You continued:
> 
> My conclusion is that there is no way to satisfy SDSC and address the
> defection problem without electing C at least as often as B on the following
> ballots:
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I have no idea what that means. But SD, SSD, BeatpathWinner/CSSD, MAM, and 
> RP meet SDSC. And, with ATLO, those ballots that you list below wouldn't 
> happen, given the preferences that you listed above.
 
49 A
24 B
27 C>B (ATLO line between C and B)

Also interesting, this is a case where a method can satisfy SDSC while
failing votes-only Minimal Defense, according to which A mustn't be elected
on the above ballots.

(So, in my claim above, I should have said that I don't believe it is possible
for a method to satisfy votes-only Minimal Defense and also address the
defection problem, without electing C with at least the probability that B
is elected.)

It could be unpleasant for the C voters if, as it turns out, the B voters don't 
prefer C to A. The voters have to be a little clever to use the ATLO.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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