[EM] summary answers
Curt Siffert
siffert at museworld.com
Mon Apr 4 01:34:31 PDT 2005
I am curious about the answers to the following questions regarding
Condorcet. Forgive me if these are simplistic, I am kind of looking
for a summary of what the consensus is here:
1) Are there cases where you would consider a candidate outside the
Schwartz set to be the proper winner?
2) Are there cases where you would consider a candidate outside the
Smith set to be the proper winner?
I'm curious about that in terms of criteria/strategy, but I'm also
curious about it in a larger way - because I think I remember Mike
saying that if we could be assured of sincere ballots, he'd prefer the
Borda winner - even if there were a different Condorcet Winner. I
disagree with that stance because I believe that it is simply more
appropriate to accord equal power to each voter, rather than allow a
passionate minority power over a less passionate majority. Who's to
say the minority is not ignorant as well as passionate? I guess an
alternate way of asking the larger question is:
3) In a two candidate race, if 51% mildly preferred A to B, and 49%
passionately preferred B to A, who should win?
I was surprised to find out that some of you might say "B". If that is
true, then I find the discussion emphasis on Condorcet tiebreakers kind
of odd. (For those of you who would say it depends on whether it is a
political vote... I might agree with that. But I am mostly thinking of
political votes when I ask the question.)
I am also curious how "common" multi-member Schwartz (or Smith) sets
are. This is an abstract question but I think it makes a difference to
the layperson how controversial the results of a voting method would
be. People tend to be concerned about circular victories, but if they
could be told that they are very rare, or at least likely to be less
common than our current rate of contested elections, then it could
help. But I have no sense on how common the circular scenario is.
Perhaps it could be compared to plurality elections finishing within a
particular vote margin or something.
Finally, I am curious if anyone has presented a solid way to figure
proportional support for multiple candidates in a Condorcet election.
For instance, given a particular Condorcet result among five
candidates, can you look at the overall "available support for all
candidates" and say that Candidate A had x% of it, Candidate B had y%
of it, etc? Obviously, the first place CW must have the highest
percentage, etc. The last time I asked, people mused about using
average vote margins between a candidate and all the people that the
candidate defeated, but this ended up being problematic. This is
relevant for questions like how to award delegates in Democratic
primary battles, how to find out how close the 2nd place candidate was
to winning, tracking how public support for a candidate/issue ebbs and
flows over election cycles, etc.
I tend to carry around the definition in my head that Condorcet methods
are "perfect" up through the identification of the Schwartz Set. For
public polling purposes, I would probably just communicate a
multi-member Schwartz Set as a tie.
Thanks,
Curt
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