[EM] cyclic ballots

[Paul Kislanko]

Only problem is no one has made a case against Jobst's original suggestion
that any method that depends upon pair-wise comparisons should allow
pair-wise input. 

The "social choice" theorists only say "I don't like them" and there's no
argument against that.

Prove that you can infer my pair-wise choices from my ranked ballot, if you
want to use my ranked ballot to populate a pair-wise matrix.

It can't be done. So just allow the voters to explicitly input their
pair-wise preferences.

This is not rocket science.

-----Original Message-----
From: election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com] On Behalf Of
James Green-Armytage
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 6:25 PM
To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
Subject: [EM] cyclic ballots


	The case for allowing cyclic ballots doesn't seem very compelling to
me,
but if there were no drawbacks to it (no case against it), then I would be
in favor of allowing them.
	So, for those who seek to advocate ballots which accommodate cyclic
individual preferences, I suggest that you shift discussion from
axiological grounds (case for) towards a demonstration that such ballots
can be adopted without incurring any significant drawbacks (addressing the
case against).
	Since acyclic ballots are the status quo in the public choice field,
and
you are arguing something that many people are not interested in spending
their time on, I suggest that advocates of cyclic ballots take on the
responsibility of seeking logical proof that no problems will result from
the adoption of cyclic ballots, in each particular method that the
advocates would like to apply them to.
	When I propose a new method, and advocate it, I feel that I have a
greater responsibility than others to evaluate the method critically, to
examine it carefully for any flaws. I think that proponents of cyclic
ballots should take the same attitude.

	In particular, I'D LIKE ADVOCATES OF CYCLIC BALLOTS TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT
THEY WILL NOT INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR STRATEGIC ABUSE. My concern is
that they will be used more for the purpose of strategic manipulation than
anything else. I want you to try to prove me wrong. If you can't, I will
not accept cyclic ballots. It's a matter of the case against being
stronger than the case for.

	The second question is one of ballot design, but I suppose that if
the
strategy question can be nullified, ballot design shouldn't be the
limiting factor. One possibility is to first give a transitive ordering,
and then to hit a button which displays your vote so far in terms of a
series of pairwise preferences, which you can then tinker with at will
before finalizing your vote. Of course, this necessitates a computer
interface, but so do a lot of other things.

	Also, I will note again that cyclic ballots seem to be incompatible
with
the STV-PR principle, which I think is the best principle for providing
proportional representation. Hence, I doubt that cyclic ballots can be
used for proportional representation systems.

Sincerely,
James Green-Armytage

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