[EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

Anthony Duff anthony_duff at yahoo.com.au
Wed Sep 1 02:47:24 PDT 2004

Thank you for than information, Steve and Bart,

Both sets of data seem to confirm that the non-existance of a sincere
condorcet winner is not "probable".  I would say: in a condorcet
election, if there happen to be several contenders, then the non
existance of a condorcet winner is a definate possibility, but it is
not probably.

I certainly agree with Bart, that cycle creation strategies might be
a very important factor.


 --- Bart Ingles <bartman at netgate.net> wrote: 
> In Merrill, "Making Multicandidate...", in the table on p.24, he
> shows
> frequency of sincere CW for 5 candidates under a random society
> simulation, and for some spatial models using either 2 or 4
> dimensions. 
> The spatial models had a CW around 98 or 99 percent of the time,
> and
> with the 5-candidate random society model there was a CW 76% of the
> time.
> That might be the greater concern-- would cycle-creation be an
> important
> strategy?  If so, then actual frequency of cycles could swamp the
> sincere figures.
> Bart
> ----
> Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
> list info

 --- Steve Eppley <seppley at alumni.caltech.edu> wrote: 
> Peter Ordeshook's book, Game Theory and Political
> Theory, has a table on p.58 listing such estimates.
> Here are its percentages assuming a large number 
> of voters:
>    #alternatives       noCW fraction
>   ---------------     ---------------
>          3                 .088
>          4                 .176
>          5                 .251
>          6                 .315
>          7                 .369
> (Interpret the #alternatives column as the number 
> of alternatives competing to be the centrist 
> compromise.)

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